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INTRODUCTION
Since its inception in the Progressive Era, the modern administrative state has functioned in tandem with the three intellectual prop†
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erty doctrines enforced by the federal government—patent, copyright,
and trademark law. Although administrative law and these intellectual property doctrines have shared a common provenance—defined,
promulgated, and enforced through federal institutions, statutes, and
case law—administrative lawyers did not discuss intellectual property,
and intellectual property lawyers similarly did not discuss administra1
tive law. Throughout the twentieth century, administrative law and
intellectual property law seemed as if they were hermetically sealed off
from each other in both theory and practice.
In recent years, the self-imposed segregation between these two
legal regimes has finally broken down. In the 1990s, legal scholars
began to explore the doctrinal and institutional relationships between
2
patents and the administrative state, and some patent scholars have
since called for a theoretical reframing of patent doctrine “through
3
the lens of regulation.” In 1999, the Supreme Court seemed to agree
with this growing cadre of academic scholarship, concluding in Dickinson v. Zurko that the Administrative Procedure Act applies to the Federal Circuit’s review of the regulations promulgated by the Patent and
4
Trademark Office (PTO). In its March 2009 decision in Tafas v. Doll,
the Federal Circuit took another step toward integrating patent law
with the administrative state, applying Chevron deference to the PTO’s
5
procedural rulemaking. However, the fractured panel decision virtually guarantees further appellate litigation (both a petition for rehear-

1

See, e.g., Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA? What the
Patent System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 270 (2007) (noting
that “inattention to administrative law principles has long been a striking feature of the
patent system”); John F. Duffy, The FCC and the Patent System: Progressive Ideals, Jacksonian Realism, and the Technology of Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1071, 1079 (2000) (observing that “the patent system . . . has been customarily ignored in studies of administrative regulation”); Craig Allen Nard, Deference, Defiance, and the Useful Arts, 56 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1415, 1420-21 (1995) (observing that “an analysis of the appropriate allocation
of interpretive authority between the Federal Circuit and PTO, in the context of patent
law, has never fully been performed”).
2
See Orin S. Kerr, Rethinking Patent Law in the Administrative State, 42 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 127, 127 n.1 (2000) (citing sources from the 1990s discussing the PTO as an
administrative agency); see also sources cited supra note 1.
3
Shubha Ghosh, Patents and the Regulatory State: Rethinking the Patent Bargain Metaphor After Eldred, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1315, 1388 (2004).
4
527 U.S. 150, 152 (1999).
5
Tafas v. Doll, No. 08-1352, 2009 WL 723353, at *5 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 20, 2009)
(Prost, J.) (“Thus, on review of a procedural rule that has been issued by the USPTO,
we will give Chevron deference to the USPTO’s interpretation of statutory provisions
that relate to the exercise of its delegated authority.”).

2009]

IP at the Birth of the Administrative State

2003
6

ing en banc and a certiorari petition to the Supreme Court). Regardless of the outcome in the appeals process, there will be substantial
7
litigation on remand as well.
Throughout this doctrinal and scholarly tumult at the recently
discovered nexus between patents and the administrative state, the
conventional wisdom maintains that administrative law and intellectual property law are two separate legal regimes that were born in
8
separate political epochs and that have evolved as distinct doctrines.
There is a kernel of truth to this standard story. Unlike patents and
copyrights, whose protection under federal law began in 1790, the
modern administrative state was born in the Progressive Era. In contrast to the limited functions of the federal government in the early
years of the American Republic, such as creating private rights in patents and copyrights under a specific enumerated power in the Consti9
tution, the Progressives took the reigns of government at a time when
many people were seeking greater federal involvement in the eco10
nomic and social conflicts precipitated by the Industrial Revolution.
Accordingly, the administrative state first concerned itself with
groundbreaking public regulation of industrial and commercial uses
6

See id. at *17 (Bryson, J., concurring) (rejecting the distinction adopted in Judge
Prost’s opinion on procedural versus substantive rules and arguing that “it is unnecessary to decide whether deference would be due to the agency’s interpretation of its
own authority, as we conclude, even without deference, that the agency has authority
to issue regulations of the sort issued in this case”); id. at *19 (Rader, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the PTO’s rules “are substantive, not procedural,” and thus maintaining that the panel should “affirm the district court’s conclusion that the PTO exceeded its statutory rulemaking authority”).
7
See id. at *15 (Prost, J.) (acknowledging the “complexity of this case” and identifying five additional legal and factual issues that need to be resolved on remand).
8
See Duffy, supra note 1, at 1133 (“Unlike the sweeping delegations conferred in
the Progressive and New Deal eras, the delegations of governmental power for the patent system were, and still are, extraordinarily narrow.”); Kerr, supra note 2, at 129
(“The patent system operates not through regulation, but rather through the private
law mechanisms of contract, property, and tort.”).
9
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“The Congress shall have power . . . . To promote the
progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.”).
10
See, e.g., JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 7, 16 (1938) (claiming
that “the growing interdependence of individuals” requires “that government assume
responsibility not merely to maintain ethical levels in the economic relations of the
members of society, but to provide for the efficient functioning of the economic processes of the state”); Francis S. Philbrick, Changing Conceptions of Property in Law, 86 U.
PA. L. REV. 691, 726 (1938) (“It is not, however, the use of ordinary property, nor the
property of ordinary or ‘natural’ persons, that presents today serious problems of adjusting law to new social conditions. Those problems arise in connection with property
for power, and therefore primarily in connection with industrial property.”).
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of land and chattels, imposing new federal regulatory controls on clas11
sic common law entitlements in tangible property rights.
Yet the conventional wisdom is also mistaken, albeit at a more
fundamental theoretical level underlying considerations of legal doctrines and institutional design. Although the early administrative state
was interested primarily in the regulation of the incidents of tangible
property—the functioning of factories and commercial transactions—
it achieved this goal on the basis of theoretical work that effected a
radical transformation in both constitutional law and property law.
The scholars who did the heavy lifting in legal theory to assist the Progressives in crafting the administrative state—legal realists who were
committed to the Progressive political agenda—had to reconceptualize the nature of property entitlements as much as they had to reconceptualize the institutional structure and powers of the federal gov12
ernment. As Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith have observed, these
legal realists “sought to undermine the notion that property is a natural right, and thereby smooth the way for activist state intervention in
13
regulating and redistributing property.”
It has long gone unnoticed, but intellectual property played a key
role in the legal realists’ innovative property theory, as best exemplified in the work of Felix Cohen and Morris Cohen, and in the work of
fellow travelers of legal realism, such as Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr. In their critique of the natural-rights theory of property,
these scholars and jurists reframed property into nominalist and positivist terms. Building on Wesley Hohfeld’s conceptual analysis of legal
14
entitlements, they redefined property as a “bundle” of rights with the
government’s grant of a right to exclude constituting the essential
right that defines a legal entitlement as “property.”

11

See Robert L. Hale, Rate Making and the Revision of the Property Concept, 22 COLUM.
L. REV. 209, 214-15 (1922) (discussing how “ownership in a manufacturing plant” is
controlled under the law); see also Eric R. Claeys, Essay, Euclid Lives? The Uneasy Legacy
of Progressivism in Zoning, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 731, 731 (2004) (recounting the standard story that the “Industrial Revolution, growing cities, and motor-powered transportation all created intense land-use conflicts,” which ultimately led to the Supreme
Court’s endorsement of zoning as a superior land-use regulatory model).
12
See generally Eric R. Claeys, The National Regulatory State in Progressive Political Theory and Twentieth-Century Constitutional Law, in MODERN AMERICA AND THE LEGACY OF
THE FOUNDING 35 (Ronald J. Pestritto & Thomas G. West eds., 2007).
13
Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 365 (2001).
14
See generally Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied
in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917).
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This work, however, was not a scholastic investigation into the
metaphysics of property, an anathema to the pragmatic legal realists.
Rather, this conceptual property theory had doctrinal traction for the
burgeoning administrative state: it explained that, as long as a property owner retains the right to exclude, the government may regulate
the use and disposition of land and chattels without violating any con15
In reconceiving property
stitutionally protected property right.
rights in this way, the Cohens and other legal realists relied on intellectual property as their primary doctrinal evidence that property is, at
its conceptual core, a right to exclude that is positively granted by the
government.
This Article uncovers this long-forgotten theoretical nexus between intellectual property and the birth of the administrative state,
revealing an important foundational connection between two legal
regimes that many modern scholars and courts have assumed were
only recently linked in theory and practice. In doing so, it makes several contributions to the current legal disputes and theoretical analyses of the regulatory status of intellectual property doctrines, particularly patent law. First, as a historical matter, it establishes that the
administrative state and intellectual property law share an important
theoretical pedigree in legal-realist property theory, affirming anew
16
the twentieth-century refrain that “we are all legal realists now.” Second, this historical insight reveals that current scholarship advancing a
regulatory theory of intellectual property rights has substantial sup17
port in the theoretical underpinnings of the administrative state. To
propose that intellectual property doctrines, such as patents, serve
regulatory policy goals is neither as novel nor as radical as many have
assumed it to be. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, this analysis
highlights salient theoretical concerns underlying both the administrative state and modern intellectual property law. In using intellectual property in their critique of the natural-rights theory of property,
the legal realists made some basic assumptions about the meaning of
15

See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005) (“A permanent
physical invasion, however minimal the economic cost it entails, eviscerates the owner’s
right to exclude others from entering and using her property—perhaps the most fundamental of all property interests.”); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979) (rejecting a takings claim arising from a federal prohibition on the sale of eagle feathers because the “loss of future profits—unaccompanied by any physical property
restriction—provides a slender reed upon which to rest a takings claim”).
16
Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465, 467 (1988) (book
review).
17
See infra notes 182-183, 197-202 and accompanying text.
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“labor” and “value,” which are central concepts in the natural-rights
theory of property. Yet, in important respects, the legal realists defined these terms differently from the natural rights philosophers. In
other words, the legal realists failed to critique the property theory of
the natural rights philosophers, such as John Locke, and the Ameri18
can jurists and lawyers who translated this theory into practice. This
oversight suggests that the legal realists’ theoretical work on property
may not have been as successful as the conventional wisdom assumes
today.
This Article proceeds in three Parts. First, it explains how the legal realists reconceptualized property into both nominalist and positivist terms—as a bundle of sticks with the state’s grant of a right to
exclude as the single essential characteristic that defines this legal entitlement as “property.” It then discusses the legal realists’ justification
for this new conception of property, detailing for the first time the exact arguments and evidence used by Felix Cohen and other legal real19
ists to advance their nominalist-positivist property theory. This argument consists primarily of a critique of the labor-based naturalrights theory of property, which, for ease of reference, this Article will
20
refer to as “Lockean property theory.”
Second, this Article will discuss how the legal realists’ critique of
Lockean property theory falls short of its target insofar as it elides an
important distinction between value and economic value (i.e.,
wealth). The balance of Part II will explicate the distinction between
these different senses of value and the role that property plays in both
defining and securing value to its creators, as set forth in chapter five
21
of John Locke’s Second Treatise. This Part will follow the lead of Felix
Cohen and his fellow legal realists in using intellectual property rights,
such as trademarks, trade secrets, and patents, to illustrate how the legal realists failed to critique Lockean property theory on its own
terms.
Third, and last, this Article will discuss the recent scholarly efforts
to reframe intellectual property rights as regulatory entitlements

18

See infra note 145 and accompanying text.
Within extant legal-realist scholarship, Felix Cohen developed the most sophisticated and systemic property theory, which is probably why his work is cited often by
modern property scholars. Accordingly, Cohen’s arguments deserve serious consideration as the best representative example of legal-realist property theory.
20
See infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
21
JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 285-302 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press, student ed. 1988) (1690).
19
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within the administrative state, revealing how these scholars are replicating, unconsciously or otherwise, the theoretical work of earlytwentieth-century Progressives and legal realists. This intellectual history is important because it cautions modern intellectual property
scholars against repeating the legal realists’ errors in assuming that
Lockean property theory provides little or no support for intellectual
property rights. In fact, the legal realists arguably misused intellectual
property in critiquing Lockean property theory. It is an empirical
question whether this misuse of intellectual property in the theoretical work underlying the administrative state destabilizes doctrinal or
scholarly work today, but this insight is important insofar as it may be
implicitly framing “the second-order questions of filling in the details
22
of the system.”
I. MODERN PROPERTY THEORY
The legal realists are responsible for both the bundle metaphor
and its attendant emphasis on the right to exclude in modern Ameri23
can property law. The Progressives found this reconceptualization of
property helpful because it made it possible for the modern administrative state to control and restrict various property uses without implicating the constitutional protections of the Takings or Due Process
24
Clauses. This was first achieved not by reinterpreting these constitutional provisions but by fundamentally redefining the meaning of
25
“property.” But how did the legal realists accomplish this jurispru-

22

See Richard A. Epstein, Intellectual Property: Old Boundaries and New Frontiers, 76
IND. L.J. 803, 827 (2001) (stating that theoretical accounts of intellectual property help
“make sense of the [intellectual property] system in its basic outlines,” which then orients scholars and judges toward “a set of guidelines that should help us deal with the
second-order questions of filling in the details of the system”).
23
See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (stating that the
right to exclude is “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are
commonly characterized as property”).
24
See, e.g., Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 517 (1944) (upholding federal
price control on the housing market and noting that all “forms of regulation[] may
reduce the value of the property regulated” but “that does not mean that the regulation is unconstitutional”); Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)
(holding that zoning is a valid regulation of property use that does not violate the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,
413 (1922) (holding a mining regulation to be an unconstitutional taking but noting
that “[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property
could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law”).
25
See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 28 (1977)
(observing that the bundle conception of property “permits the [lawyer] to escape a
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dential transformation in property law? Interestingly, no one has yet
answered this question.
Within modern property scholarship, some professors simply assume that the legal realists got the better of their historical predeces26
sors. Given the sweeping revolution wrought within American law by
27
the legal realists, this assumption is not entirely unjustified. Yet it is
an assumption all the same. Even for those scholars who do not necessarily agree with legal-realist property theory, no one has yet assessed
the actual premises, lines of reasoning, and doctrinal evidence used by
Felix Cohen and other legal realists in advancing their new property
theory. To date, scholars in both groups have simply described the
shift in property theory at the turn of the last century from natural
rights philosophy to the realist mélange of nominalism, positivism,
28
and pragmatism. Even more important, no modern legal scholar has
assessed whether Cohen and other legal realists actually succeeded in
justifying this conceptual shift in property theory, which has served as
one of the supporting pillars of the edifice of the modern administrative state.
The purpose of this Part is to fill this gap in the intellectual history
of early-twentieth-century American property theory. First, it will discuss the nominalist and positivist nature of legal-realist property theory, what is referred to by modern legal professionals as the “bundle
of sticks” metaphor with its attendant emphasis on the right to exclude as the essential stick that defines a legal entitlement as property.
Second, it will discuss for the first time the actual arguments used by
the legal realists to justify this shift to the bundle metaphor and the
exclusion conception of property, identifying the central role of intellectual property within their theoretical arguments. As such, this Part
is descriptive, but it is necessary to set forth the basic outlines of longforgotten arguments before one can assess whether or not these arguments were successful in justifying the now widely accepted bundle
metaphor and exclusion conception of property.
‘literal’ construction of the [Takings] clause that would transform him into an implacable foe of the modern state”).
26
See, e.g., id. at 26-29, 98-100 (contrasting the “layman’s” view of property as thing
ownership with the lawyer’s “scientific” analysis of property as a “bundle” of legal relations).
27
See Singer, supra note 16, at 467 (“All major current schools of thought are, in
significant ways, products of legal realism. To some extent, we are all realists now.”).
28
See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of Justification, 86 CAL. L. REV. 241, 251-60 (1998); Adam Mossoff, What is Property? Putting the
Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 371, 372 (2003).
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A. Bundles of Sticks and the Right To Exclude
A brief foray into modern property theory is necessary to set the
background context for identifying the ways in which the legal realists
used intellectual property in their conceptual analysis of property. It
is not the purpose of this section to provide a comprehensive review of
American property theory, which would be impossible to do in a single law journal article, let alone in a single section. What suffices here
is a more narrow and defensible insight: the legal realists reconceptualized property entitlements into both nominalist and positivist terms,
popularizing within American property law the bundle metaphor and
its attendant emphasis on the right to exclude as the essential characteristic of the legal right to property. It is also important to recognize
that the legal realists were not interested in property theory as an end
in itself. These abstract conceptual moves served the political goal of
making property more plastic as a legal and constitutional restraint on
29
the then-nascent administrative state.
It is widely recognized that modern lawyers employ a nominalist
definition of “property.” In their first year of law school, law students
learn the modern orthodoxy that “property” refers to an aggregate set
of social relations—various rights and obligations between citizens
30
that are bundled together for socially contingent policy reasons.
Thus, in contrast to the layperson who believes that “property” necessarily refers to a right to use something in the world, lawyers and

29

See Eric R. Claeys, Jefferson Meets Coase: Land-Use Torts, Law and Economics, and
Natural Property Rights, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 4647), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1117999. Claeys writes,
The Realists . . . needed to revise property conceptual theory for substantive political reasons. The political assumptions informing their conception of
social science led them to believe that resource uses could and needed to be
managed by experts applying “scientific” conceptions of social efficiency. If
the concept “property” is a nominalist term—that is, if “property” refers to
“that which the law happens to call property in a particular case”—the term
would allow experts to manage particular uses of property in particular resource disputes without needing to worry overmuch that the conceptual structure of property might limit their efforts.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
30
See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 81 (6th ed. 2006) (defining property as
comprising “a number of disparate rights, a ‘bundle’ of them: the right to possess, the
right to use, the right to exclude, the right to transfer”); JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER,
PROPERTY LAW, at xxxix, xlix (4th ed. 2006) (noting that “[o]wners of property generally possess a bundle of entitlements” and that property theory helps justify the nature and
scope of these intricate “social relations”).
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judges employ the well-worn metaphor that it comprises only a “bun31
dle of sticks.”
The progenitor of this nominalist “bundle” metaphor was Wesley
Hohfeld’s conceptual reconstruction of property into an assortment
32
The legal realists,
of rights, privileges, powers, and immunities.
though, are responsible for giving Hohfeld’s somewhat abstruse terminological analysis its traction within the minds of more practically
33
oriented American lawyers and judges. After legal realism effected
its revolution in American law in the early twentieth century, lawyers
and judges conceived of property in the nominalist terms of “social
34
35
relationships” or “legal relations.” By 1934, Walton Hamilton famously defined property as “a euphonious collocation of letters which
serves as a general term for the miscellany of equities that persons
36
hold in the commonwealth.”
As I and others have often pointed out, Thomas Grey was correct
in observing that the legal realists fragmented the “robust unitary
conception of ownership into a more shadowy ‘bundle of rights,’”
31

Gerald Korngold & Andrew P. Morris, Introduction: The Story of Property Stories,
in PROPERTY STORIES 1 (Gerald Korngold & Andrew P. Morris eds., 2004); see also
United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 278 (2002) (“A common idiom describes property
as a ‘bundle of sticks’—a collection of individual rights which, in certain combinations,
constitute property.”); STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 16-17 (1990) (discussing the “sophisticated conception” of property as a “bundle of ‘sticks’” or a set of
legal “relations among persons or other entities with respect to things”).
32
See generally Hohfeld, supra note 14.
33
See, e.g., BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 129 (1928)
(“The bundle of power and privileges to which we give the name of ownership is not
constant through the ages. The faggots must be put together and rebound from time
to time.”).
34
Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 361-63
(1954); see also 1 RICHARD T. ELY, PROPERTY AND CONTRACT IN THEIR RELATION TO THE
DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH 96 (1914) (“The essence of property is in the relations
among men arising out of their relations to things.” (emphasis omitted)); ALEXANDER
LINDSAY, ESSAY IN PROPERTY: ITS DUTIES AND RIGHTS 70 (2d ed. 1922) (“[P]rivate
property . . . . is a right vested in individuals thought of as set over against one another,
and it requires the recognition and protection of society for its existence.”); Hohfeld,
supra note 14, at 743 (“[T]he supposed single right in rem [in property] . . . really involves as many separate and distinct ‘right-duty’ relations as there are persons subject
to a duty . . . .”).
35
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY ch. 1, introductory note (1936); see also Arthur L. Corbin (A.L.C.), Comment, Taxation of Seats on the Stock Exchange, 31 YALE L.J.
429, 429 (1922) (“Our concept of property has shifted . . . . ‘[P]roperty’ has ceased to
describe any res, or object of sense, at all, and has become merely a bundle of legal relations . . . .”).
36
Walton H. Hamilton & Irene Till, Property, in 11 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 528, 528 (Edwin R.A. Seligman & Alvin Johnson eds., 1937).
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which “disintegrated” property as an internally cohesive legal con37
cept. Unlike David Hume, who felt that he could safely leave his
metaphysical skepticism at his writing desk when he reengaged the
38
ordinary world of human activities, the legal realists knew their
nominalism concerned a legal concept that was used by everyday lawyers and judges. And, as Hamlet put it, there was the rub: all legal
concepts, such as contracts and torts, refer to specified sets of legal relationships. If property was defined tautologically as a collection of
legal relationships, then there was nothing to distinguish “property” as
a species within the genus of law. If property was to remain a viable
and determinate legal concept within the legal realists’ social conception of legal rights, then they had to, in Felix Cohen’s words, “get rid
39
of the confusion of nomimalism.”
Cohen and his legal-realist brethren succeeded in ridding themselves of the disintegrating effects of nominalism by finding refuge in
positivism. In this way, they maintained their commitment to the social definition of property, but they recognized that there was one essential social characteristic of property that was not shared with other
legal concepts—the state’s grant to a citizen of the right to exclude
40
others. Felix Cohen thus proffered a new “realistic definition of pri41
vate property” in his article Dialogue on Private Property: “Private
37

Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in PROPERTY: NOMOS XXII, at 69,
69 ( J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980); see also Nestor M. Davidson,
Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1597, 1646-47 (2008)
(recognizing that the legal realists had an “anti-essentialist focus on the legally constructed and contingent nature of property” that was “predicated on the disintegration
of property into constituent elements”); Mossoff, supra note 28, at 372-74 (identifying
the same point and citing others who have also observed this problem).
38
See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 269 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., Oxford University Press 2d ed. 1978) (1793); see also DAVID HUME, ENQUIRIES CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING AND CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 160 (L.A.
Selby-Bigge ed., Oxford University Press 3d ed. 1975) (1777).
39
Cohen, supra note 34, at 378; cf. Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1193 (1999) (“While the modern bundle-of-legal relations
metaphor reflects well the possibility of complex relational fragmentation, it gives a
weak sense of the ‘thingness’ of private property.”).
40
See, e.g., Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 246 (1918) (Holmes,
J., dissenting) (asserting that “[p]roperty depends upon exclusion by law from interference”); id. at 250 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“An essential element of individual
property is the legal right to exclude others from enjoying it.”); Hamilton & Till, supra
note 36, at 536 (“It is incorrect to say that the judiciary protected property; rather they
called that property to which they accorded protection.”); Hohfeld, supra note 14, at
745-46 (explaining that the right to exclude is the only claim-right constituting the in
rem legal relation among citizens known as “property”).
41
Cohen, supra note 34, at 378.
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property is a relationship among human beings such that the so-called
owner can exclude others from certain activities or permit others to
engage in those activities and in either case secure the assistance of
42
the law in carrying out his decision.”
Cohen’s insight here was hardly novel (and he admitted as much).
In his work, Felix Cohen cited his father and fellow legal realist, Morris Cohen, who wrote in the 1920s that “the essence of private prop43
erty is always the right to exclude others.” Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., a fellow traveler of the legal realists, had written several
decades earlier that the essence of property is that an “owner is al44
lowed to exclude all, and is accountable to no one.”
The claim that the right to exclude is the essential characteristic
of the legally protected entitlement known as “property” soon became
orthodoxy within modern property theory. By the end of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court confidently asserted that the right to
exclude is “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that
45
are commonly characterized as property.” Thomas Merrill, a leading
property scholar, has gone a step further, declaring that “the right to
exclude others is more than just ‘one of the most essential’ constitu46
ents of property—it is the sine qua non.”
It has become commonplace to identify the legal realists as the
47
fountainhead for the nominalist “bundle” metaphor. This is true,
but the legal realists more rightly deserve credit for the positivist claim
in American property law that the right to exclude is the essence of
the legal entitlement referred to as “property.” This is important insofar as prominent property scholars today critique the legal realists’
48
“bundle” conception of property, while at the same time advancing
42

Id. at 373.
Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 12 (1927).
44
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 246 (1881).
45
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979); see also Coll. Sav. Bank v.
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 673 (1999) (“The hallmark of a protected property interest is the right to exclude others.”).
46
Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 730
(1998).
47
See Eric R. Claeys, Property 101: Is Property a Thing or a Bundle?, 32 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 617, 635 (2009) (book review) (“Contemporary property scholars . . . often assume that the ad hoc bundle conception was the only legacy from Realist property
scholarship.”); Merrill & Smith, supra note 13, at 365 (claiming that the bundle of
rights metaphor “became popular among the legal realists in the 1920s and 1930s”).
48
See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 46, at 737 (“For the Realists, property was not defined by a single right or definitive trilogy of rights. Rather it is a ‘bundle of rights.’
Moreover, this bundle has no fixed core or constituent elements.”).
43
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(apparently without realizing it) the legal realists’ exclusion conception
49
of property. Until the legal realists are recognized as the source of
both the bundle metaphor and exclusion conceptions of property, the
nexus between realist property theory and modern intellectual property
50
law will remain lost within the record of American legal history.
B. The Use of IP To Redefine Property in Land
The legal realists’ revolution in property theory, especially in their
redefinition of this legal entitlement in terms of the right to exclude,
was predicated on a scathing critique of Lockean property theory.
Their arguments were very much of the form that, given the logical
incoherence of Lockean property theory, their claim that property
comprises a state-granted right to exclude wins by default. As has
been observed of the legal realists, their arguments were primarily
critical—they stood more for what they were not than for what they
51
were.
As a result, the legal realists’ explanation for the merits of both
the bundle metaphor and the exclusion conception of property was a
bit thin. On one hand, their positing of the nominalist bundle meta52
phor often constituted nothing more than a bald assertion. In an article in the Yale Law Journal in 1932, for instance, Hamilton believed it

49

See THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY, at v (2007) (claiming
that “property at its core entails the right to exclude others from some discrete thing”);
Merrill, supra note 46, at 754 (asserting that “property means the right to exclude others from valued resources, no more and no less”).
50
Cf. Adam Mossoff, Exclusion and Exclusive Use in Patent Law, 22 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 321, 360-70 (2009) (identifying a nexus between the legal realists’ exclusion
conception of property theory and modern patent theory).
51
See Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism—Responding to Dean Pound, 44
HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1233-34 (1931) (observing that the legal realists were not of one
mind on any issue in law or politics); see also NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE 69 (1995) (“Realism was more a mood than a movement. That mood
was one of dissatisfaction with legal formalism . . . .”).
52
See CARDOZO, supra note 33, at 129 (“The bundle of power and privileges to
which we give the name of ownership is not constant through the ages.”); Corbin, supra note 35, at 429 (asserting that “‘property’ has ceased to describe any res, or object
of sense, at all, and has become merely a bundle of legal relations—rights, powers,
privileges, immunities”); Hale, supra note 11, at 214 (“The right of ownership in a
manufacturing plant is, to use Hohfeld’s terms, a privilege to operate the plant, plus a
privilege not to operate it, plus a right to keep others from operating it, plus a power to
acquire all the rights of ownership in the products.”); see also J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of
Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 714 (1996) (observing that “‘[p]roperty
is a bundle of rights’ is little more than a slogan” and noting that “[t]here is no real
theory that property is a bundle of rights”).
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sufficient to criticize a contemporary scholar’s analysis of Lockean
property theory by simply pointing out that the “pages are barren of a
Hohfeldian analysis of the wousin called property into the conglomerate mass of rights, duties, privileges, and immunities which make it
53
up.”
On the other hand, the legal realists’ argument that property is
essentially the right to exclude (granted and enforced by the state)
was a bit more substantive. Of course, even in arguing the positive
case for the right to exclude, the legal realists spoke in their characteristically strident rhetoric. At the outset, they rejected the longstanding definition of property in American law: “Property is the ex54
clusive right of possessing, enjoying, and disposing of a thing.” This
definition, according to Felix Cohen, represented “the ‘thingification’
of property,” which perpetuated a myth that “courts are not creating
55
property, but are merely recognizing a pre-existent Something.”
56
Cohen dismissed this as “transcendental nonsense,” which reflected
the “metaphysical doctrine of Duns Scotus, William of Occam, and
other 14th and 15th century scholastics who held that all reality is tan57
gible and exists in space.”
There was a substantive argument behind this bluster, and within
it we can identify two separate prongs, although the legal realists did
not structure their argument in precisely this way. The first part constituted a conceptual claim about the proper definition of property,
and the second part constituted a logical critique of Lockean property
theory. The first part of their argument—the conceptual claim that
property is essentially the right to exclude—was neither lengthy nor
complex. Felix Cohen and other scholars and judges, such as Wesley
Hohfeld, Morris Cohen, and Justice Holmes, repeatedly observed that

53

Walton H. Hamilton, Property—According to Locke, 41 YALE L.J. 864, 865 (1932)
(citing PASCHAL LARKIN, PROPERTY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY (1930)).
54
McKeon v. Bisbee, 9 Cal. 137, 143 (1858); see also Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 310 (1795) (“[T]he right of acquiring and possessing property, and having it protected, is one of the natural, inherent, and unalienable rights of
man.”); City of Denver v. Bayer, 2 P. 6, 6-7 (Colo. 1883) (“Property, in its broader and
more appropriate sense, is not alone the chattel or the land itself, but the right to
freely possess, use, and alienate the same . . . .”); Eaton v. B. C. & M. R.R., 51 N.H. 504,
511 (1872) (“Property is the right of any person to possess, use, enjoy, and dispose of a
thing.” (quoting Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378, 433 (1856))).
55
Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM.
L. REV. 809, 815 (1935).
56
Id. at 809.
57
Cohen, supra note 34, at 361.
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the law secured incorporeal entitlements as “property,” such as pat58
ents, copyrights, and goodwill. As such, they maintained that there
was simply no basis whatsoever to define property according to physical possession or use of a thing in the real world. Arthur Corbin thus
observed, “Our concept of property has shifted; incorporeal rights
59
have become property.”
According to Felix Cohen, the transcendental nonsense in the
“thingification of property” was especially clear in light of intellectual
60
property rights, such as a “patent on a chemical process.” Such a
61
patent was incapable of being physically possessed like land or a fox,
but no one denied that patents are legally enforced property rights.
Accordingly, patents are property if and only if the state enforces an
inventor’s right to exclude others from using the legally protected in62
vention. If the right to exclude is the single legal relation that defined patents and other intellectual property rights as “property,” mutatis mutandis, land and chattels must also be defined by the same
essential element of a state-granted right to exclude. QED.
63
Unlike Justice Holmes and Morris Cohen, Felix Cohen did not
rest on his laurels with this somewhat simple analytical argument.
Cohen further argued that the positivist redefinition of property in
terms of the right to exclude also revealed how the “vicious circle in64
herent in [Lockean property theory] is plain.” The problem was
Lockean property theory’s claim that the law secured the valuable
fruits of one’s labors.
In his Dialogue on Private Property, Cohen explained that property
constitutes the grant of a right to exclude others by the state, and thus
any value in something is merely a consequent of creating this legal
entitlement—not an antecedent. If it were otherwise, as Felix Cohen

58

See Mossoff, supra note 50, at 360-65 (discussing the realists’ use of patents and
other IP rights to justify the conceptual claim that “property” means only a right to exclude).
59
Corbin, supra note 35, at 429.
60
Cohen, supra note 34, at 360.
61
See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) (upholding first possession for claiming land as property); Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805)
(upholding the rule of capture for claiming property in wild animals).
62
Felix Cohen summarized “property in terms of a simple label” as follows: “To
the world: Keep off X unless you have my permission, which I may grant or withhold.
Signed: Private Citizen. Endorsed: The state.” Cohen, supra note 34, at 374 (italics
added).
63
See HOLMES, supra note 44, at 246; Cohen, supra note 43, at 45.
64
Cohen, supra note 55, at 815.
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aptly put it, then it would be logically impossible to have valueless
property, such as purely personal papers that are meaningful only to
65
their author. If value inexorably leads to property, it would also be
66
logically impossible to have valuable nonproperty, such as clean air.
Yet no one doubts that personal papers are property and that clean air
is not property; neither of these propositions is equivalent to claiming
that one can square a circle. Thus, it is undeniable “that not only is
67
there valueless property, but there is also propertyless value.” Cohen
68
drove the conceptual point home: “in short, property is not wealth.”
In another seminal article, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, Felix Cohen directly criticized the circular legal reasoning that he believed was inherent in the claim that property arose
from the valuable prelegal labor and use of something in the world.
Here, Cohen used trademark doctrine to illustrate what he saw as the
69
fundamental illogic of this basic tenet of Lockean property theory.
He first observed that courts increasingly have departed from traditional trademark theory’s concerns about unfair competition and consumer protection, and have instead justified trademark protection ac70
cording to Lockean property theory. Cohen was incorrect in his
historical claim, as courts had long secured trademarks under
71
Lockean property theory. In 1849, for instance, a New York court
issued an injunction on a finding of trademark infringement on the
grounds that “the [trademark] owner is robbed of the fruits of the
72
reputation that he had successfully labored to earn.” Thus, Cohen’s
critique had a greater theoretical and historical bite than he even realized.

65

Cohen, supra note 34, at 363-64.
Id. at 364.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Modern trademark law is conceptually muddled. Cohen recognized that the
doctrine is muddled, but he argued that trademarks are classified conceptually as
“property” because courts permit trademark owners to obtain “injunctive relief,” which
is the legal remedy that enforces the right to exclude. Cohen, supra note 55, at 814. In
fact, law and economics now identifies legal entitlements providing for injunctive relief
as “property rules.” See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972)
(setting forth the now-famous property rule (injunction) and liability rule (damages)
distinction).
70
Cohen, supra note 55, at 814.
71
See Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1839, 1873-85 (2007).
72
Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. Spear, 2 Sand. Ch. 599, 606 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1849).
66
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Cohen nonetheless preferred to focus on trademark cases of more
73
recent vintage, and he restated the “current legal argument” for protecting trademarks as property rights as follows:
[1] One who by the ingenuity of his advertising or the quality of his
product . . . has thereby created a thing of value;
[2] a thing of value is property;
[3] [therefore] the creator of property is entitled to protection against
third parties who seek to deprive him of his property.74

The circularity, according to Cohen, is in the second premise: a
thing of value is property. What makes something potentially valuable
is not some characteristic or feature that preexists the law; it is the legal classification of this thing as property—whether it be a trademark,
land, a share of stock, or anything else to which a court or legislature
attaches a right to exclude. As Justice Holmes pointed out in INS v.
75
Associated Press, in which he dissented from the Court’s decision to
extend property protection over valuable news items that were obtained from the labors of a news organization, “[p]roperty, a creation
of law, does not arise from value . . . . Property depends upon exclu76
sion by law from interference . . . .” In court decisions protecting
land, chattels, trademarks, or some other form of exclusive entitlement, the legal realists and their fellow travelers maintained that value
is a consequent of the legal classification of something as property,
not an antecedent. In saying otherwise, Lockean property theory was
incoherent. As English Progressive and property theorist Alexander
Lindsay concluded, “[t]he attempt to make the right of property inherent in the individual apart from society is false to the facts of the
77
creation of wealth.”
The legal realists’ arguments about property had a profound impact beyond the confines of straightforward property doctrines, such

73

See Cohen, supra note 55, at 815 n.18 (discussing Am. Agric. Chem. Co. v.
Moore, 17 F.2d 196 (M.D. Ala. 1927)).
74
Id. at 815. This is a formalized representation of Cohen’s sentence. It could be
symbolically presented as A o B, B = C, A, ? C.
75
248 U.S. 215 (1918).
76
Id. at 246 (Holmes, J., dissenting in part).
77
LINDSAY, supra note 34, at 70. Lindsay’s work was known to the American legal
realists. See, e.g., MORRIS R. COHEN & FELIX S. COHEN, READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE
AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 98-99 (1951) (reproducing an excerpt of Lindsay’s Essay in
Property: Its Duties and Rights, supra note 34).
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78

as the estates system and restrictive covenants. In fact, the legal realists were not interested in property theory as such. Their work was
part and parcel of a broader political program that sought to direct
the use, development, and disposal of land and chattels through regulatory rules crafted by experts staffing the newly created federal and
79
state administrative agencies. Politically, the legal realists’ argument
succeeded, and the administrative state is now a fact of the modern
American constitutional order. Theoretically, however, there remains
an open question as to whether the legal realists’ arguments about the
illogic of Lockean property theory succeeded or not, which was the
sole argument in favor of their claim to the logical necessity of defining property in terms of the right to exclude. This assessment of the
details of legal-realist property theory, including its use of intellectual
property, is the purpose of Part II.
II. THE ABUSE OF IP TO REDEFINE PROPERTY IN LAND
The legal realists have been accused of “bombast” and “broad80
brushed polemic,” and Felix Cohen’s accusation that Lockean property theory is “transcendental nonsense” on par with other “transcendental conceptions of God, matter, the Absolute, essence and acci81
dent, substance and attribute,” seems to fall within the scope of this
criticism. Yet Cohen’s property theory made substantive points, and it
was not simply hyperbolic rhetoric. The positivist conception of
property as securing only a right to exclude was predicated on the
82
work of Jeremy Bentham and other utilitarian philosophers. Even

78

See, e.g., Sommer v. Kridel, 378 A.2d 767, 772-73 (N.J. 1977) (holding that “antiquated real property concepts which served as the basis for the pre-existing rule, shall
no longer be controlling,” and that “claims must be governed by more modern notions
of fairness and equity”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 1.4, § 1.4
cmt. a (2000) (eliminating the distinction between real covenants and equitable servitudes because “much of the 19th century complexity is irrelevant and unnecessary”).
79
See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394-95 (1926) (holding
that zoning regulations are not arbitrary because “zoning has received much attention
at the hands of commissions and experts” and their comprehensive reports “bear every
evidence of painstaking consideration”).
80
DUXBURY, supra note 51, at 112 (referring to Fred Rodell and Thurman Arnold).
81
Cohen, supra note 55, at 826.
82
See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 231 (Wilfrid E.
Rumble ed., 1995) (1832) (“Every legal right is the creature of positive law.”); JEREMY
BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 113 (C.K. Ogden ed., Richard Hildreth trans.,
Routlege & Kegan Paul Ltd. 1931) (1864) (“Property and law are born together, and
die together. Before laws were made there was no property; take away laws, and prop-
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the “bundle” metaphor was first employed several decades before the
83
legal-realist revolution in the 1910s and 1920s.
The legal realists
simply gave the bundle metaphor its theoretical (and doctrinal) traction within American property law. Moreover, Cohen’s functionalist
account of the law, from property to jurisdiction to due process, was
grounded in the pragmatic philosophy of C.S. Peirce, William James,
84
and John Dewey. Cohen was certainly standing on the shoulders of
these philosophers when he pronounced that “[a]ll concepts that
cannot be defined in terms of the elements of actual experience are
85
meaningless.”
The purpose of this Part is to reconsider Felix Cohen’s critique of
Lockean property theory, as further supported in the work of other
realists, such as Morris Cohen. Since the legal realists’ arguments
were principally critical, it is first necessary to set forth a basic outline
of Lockean property theory. Given John Locke’s influence in early
86
American politics and law, his argument for the natural right to
property serves nicely as an exemplar of natural rights philosophy. To
the extent that some scholars are skeptical of Locke’s actual influence
87
on early American political and legal thought, his property theory
simply serves as an easily recognized proxy for natural-rights property
theory generally. Once the framework of Locke’s property theory has
erty ceases.”); see also Philbrick, supra note 10, at 729 (citing Bentham for the proposition that “property is the creature and dependent of law”).
83
See Penner, supra note 52, at 713 n.8 (discussing the provenance of the bundle
metaphor in the late 1800s).
84
See Cohen, supra note 55, at 826 (advancing a functionalist account of law based
in the pragmatic and positivist philosophy “vigorously pressed by C. S. Peirce, James,
Dewey, Russell, Whitehead, C. I. Lewis, C. D. Broad, and most recently by the Viennese
School, primarily by Wittgenstein and Carnap”).
85
Id.
86
See Richard A. Epstein, No New Property, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 747, 750 (1990) (observing that American property lawyers are the “inheritors of the Lockean tradition”).
87
See, e.g., David L. Wardle, Reason to Ratify: The Influence of John Locke’s Religious
Beliefs on the Creation and Adoption of the United States Constitution, 26 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
291, 297 (2002) (“Locke’s influence on the Constitution was not as strong in the actual
substance and form of the document as that of Montesquieu; rather, it was more indirect, creating an atmosphere in early America conducive to its creation and adoption.”); see also GARRY WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA: JEFFERSON’S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 171-75 (1978) (arguing that Locke had little to no influence in the actual
writing of the Declaration of Independence); Jason F. Robinson, Book Review: Gerber’s
To Secure These Rights, 12 J.L. & POL. 123, 132-33 (1996) (“Since the mid-1960s, historians have challenged the prevailing Lockean interpretation of the American founding, arguing that the American revolutionaries were concerned less with individual
rights and limited government than with the cultivation of a virtuous, public-spirited
citizenry willing to sacrifice individual self interest for the greater public good.”).
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been set up, it can then serve as the foil against which to evaluate its
critique by Felix Cohen and other legal realists.
A. Lockean Property Theory: Labor, Value, and Property
John Locke articulated his famous and influential version of the
labor theory of property in chapter five of the Second Treatise. In the
88
theory’s bare-bones outline, Locke first proposes that “Labour, in the
Beginning, gave a Right of Property, where-ever any one was pleased to
89
imploy it, upon what was common.” Locke then argues that “’tis La90
bour indeed that puts the difference of value on every thing.” The premises of the argument are clear: value is necessarily created by labor, as
91
this term is defined by Locke, and labor is the necessary and suffi92
cient condition for creating property in the state of nature. The
creation of value therefore is a necessary element in the creation of a
property right deserving of protection under the law in civil society.
The legal implication of Lockean property theory is inescapable: if
93
the purpose of the state is to secure property rights, then the law
should secure as property the valuable products and services created
by original laborers. As Justice William Patterson wrote in Vanhorne’s
Lessee v. Dorrance in 1798, “[n]o man would become a member of a
community, in which he could not enjoy the fruits of his honest la94
bour and industry.”

88

The specifics of Locke’s property theory will be explicated in greater detail at
the relevant points in assessing Felix Cohen’s critique. See, e.g., infra notes 147-160 and
accompanying text (discussing how “labor” refers to “production” in Locke’s property
theory).
89
LOCKE, supra note 21, at 299. In his famous mixing-labor argument for property, Locke claims “[t]he labour that was mine, removing [things] out of that common
state they were in, hath fixed my Property in them.” Id. at 289.
90
Id. at 296.
91
See Adam Mossoff, Locke’s Labor Lost, 9 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 155 (2002)
(discussing Locke’s thick notion of “labor” in his theory of property); see also STEPHEN
BUCKLE, NATURAL LAW AND THE THEORY OF PROPERTY 151 (1991) (“The doctrine of
the origin of property through labor will not properly be understood if it is not recognized that Locke thinks of labour as a rational (or purposeful), value-creating activity.”).
92
See LOCKE, supra note 21, at 292 (“The Measure of Property, Nature has well set,
by the Extent of Mens[’] Labour . . . .”).
93
See id. at 350 (observing that people “joyn [sic] in Society . . . for the mutual
Preservation of their Lives, Liberties and Estates, which I call by the general Name, Property”).
94
Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 310 (1795).
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The impact of Locke’s property theory on early Americans was
tremendous. One illustrative example is James Madison’s 1792 essay,
95
aptly titled Property. In this short essay, published in the National Gazette, Madison argued that “property” is sometimes used in a strictly legal sense, referring to “a man’s land, or merchandize, or money,” but
that this term also has a “larger and juster meaning, [in which] it embraces every thing to which a man may attach a value and have a
96
right.” Madison thus condemned any government action that “violates [individuals’] property, in their actual possessions [or] in the la97
bor that acquires their daily subsistence.” In the Founding Era and in
the Antebellum Era, Madison was not alone among American political
98
and legal scholars in his commitment to Lockean property theory.
Beyond political tracts and legal treatises, jurists in the nineteenth
century often employed Lockean property theory to define the meaning of property within American law. Justice David Brewer explained
in a speech at Yale Law School that “[p]roperty is as certainly destroyed when the use of that which is the subject of property is taken
99
away . . . for that which gives value to property, is its capacity for use.”
Several years earlier, the New York Court of Appeals announced in In
re Jacobs that “[p]roperty . . . has no value unless it can be used. Its capability for enjoyment and adaptability to some use are essential characteristics and attributes without which property cannot be con100
ceived.” This was not dicta, as the Jacobs Court used this restatement
of Lockean property theory to invalidate a regulation prohibiting cigar manufacturing in tenement houses, concluding that the regula101
tion deprived the tenants of their constitutional due process rights.
As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court similarly observed in 1823, “prop102
erty, without the power of use and disposition, is an empty sound.”

95

James Madison, Property, NAT’L GAZETTE, Mar. 29, 1792, reprinted in JAMES MADIWRITINGS 515 ( Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999).
96
Id. at 515 (emphasis added).
97
Id. at 517.
98
See Laura S. Underkuffler, On Property: An Essay, 100 YALE L.J. 127, 137 (1990)
(“The broad conception of property found in Madison’s essay, and implicit in the writings of others in the Founding Era, is not an aberration in intellectual history.”); see
also Mossoff, supra note 28, at 404-07 (same).
99
D.J. Brewer, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Protection of Private Property from
Public Attack, Address at the Yale Law School Graduation Ceremony ( June 23, 1891),
as reprinted in 10 GREEN BAG 2D 495, 501 (2007).
100
In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98, 105 (1885).
101
Id. at 115.
102
In re Flintham’s Appeal, 11 Serg. & Rawle 16, 23 (Pa. 1824) (Duncan, J.).
SON,
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B. Lockean Property Theory and Intellectual Property
As is clear from the previous Section, Lockean property theory was
not a theoretical boogeyman invented by Felix Cohen and other legal
realists to make their positivist conception of property seem reasonable by comparison. Throughout the nineteenth century, courts employed Lockean property theory to justify the protection of property
rights, especially the new forms of intellectual property that were coming into existence as a result of the Industrial Revolution. For instance, in 1868 in Peabody v. Norfolk, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts became the first American court to hold that trade se103
According to the Peabody
crets should be protected as property.
court, the reason for its decision was simply a matter of treating like
cases alike:
If a man establishes a business and makes it valuable by his skill and attention, the good will of that business is recognized by the law as property. If he adopts and publicly uses a trade mark, he has a remedy, either at law or in equity, against those who undertake to use it without his
104
permission.

Since the valuable labor that created a trade secret was no different in kind from the valuable labor that created good will or trademarks, there was no reason that the courts should not protect trade
secrets as the property rights of their creators. In 1984 in Ruckelshaus
v. Monsanto Co., the United States Supreme Court continued this long
tradition of relying on Lockean property theory to justify the legal
protection of trade secrets as property—explicitly citing John Locke
for the proposition that property arises from “labour and inven105
tion.”
The Monsanto Court’s reference to “invention” was not happenstance. The Peabody court had similarly invoked patented inventions
106
as exemplars of valuable property already secured under the law.
Throughout the nineteenth century, courts often justified the protection of patents under the Lockean principle that the state should secure to people the fruits of their labors; in patent cases, it was the

103

98 Mass. 452, 458 (1868).
Id. at 457.
105
467 U.S. 986, 1003 (1984) (citing JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL
GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 14-26 ( J.W. Gough ed., 1946)
(1690)).
106
Peabody, 98 Mass. at 457-58.
104
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107

fruits of inventive labors.
Nineteenth-century courts similarly invoked Lockean property theory to justify protecting patents as consti108
tutional private property under the Takings Clause.
It should be unsurprising, then, that one finds Chancellor James
Kent, in his influential Commentaries on American Law, classifying both
copyrights and patents as property obtained through “[o]riginal
109
Chancellor Kent observed
[a]cquisition by [i]ntellectual [l]abor.”
that “[i]t is just that [authors and inventors] should enjoy the pecuni110
In 1824,
ary profits resulting from mental as well as bodily labor.”
Daniel Webster proposed a bill that would make it possible for foreign
inventors to apply for United States patents, declaring in his floor
speech in the House of Representatives:
And, at this time of day, and before this Assembly, . . . he need not argue
that the right of the inventor is a high property; it is the fruit of his
mind—it belongs to him more than any other property—he does not
inherit it—he takes it by no man’s gift—it peculiarly belongs to him, and
111
he ought to be protected in the enjoyment of it.

Webster repeated this argument throughout his life. It is notable
that he explicitly invoked it in 1852 in his last court appearance, in
which he successfully represented Charles Goodyear (the inventor of
vulcanized rubber) in Goodyear’s patent infringement lawsuit against
112
Horace Day. Webster won the day for Goodyear with an explicit appeal to Lockean property theory to justify Goodyear’s patent rights,
proclaiming that “[i]nvention, as a right of property, stands higher
than inheritance or devise, because it is personal earning. It is more like
acquisitions by the original right of nature. In all these there is an ef113
In ruling in favor of
fort of mind as well as muscular strength.”
107

See Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought About Patents? Reevaluating the Patent “Privilege” in Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 953, 992-93 (2007).
108
See Adam Mossoff, Patents as Constitutional Private Property: The Historical Protection of Patents Under the Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV. 689, 700-07 (2007).
109
2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 474 (O.W. Holmes, Jr. ed.,
12th ed., Little, Brown, and Co. 1873) (1826).
110
Id.
111
41 ANNALS OF CONG. 934 (1824). Even the congressmen who disagreed with
Webster’s specific legislative proposal, such as Representative Buchanan, found common cause with Webster that the law should secure “the property which an inventor
has in that which is the product of his own genius.” Id. at 936.
112
CHARLES SLACK, NOBLE OBSESSION: CHARLES GOODYEAR, THOMAS HANCOCK,
AND THE RACE TO UNLOCK THE GREATEST INDUSTRIAL SECRET OF THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY 182-88 (2002).
113
Argument in the Goodyear Rubber Case, in 15 THE WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF
DANIEL WEBSTER 437, 438 (Edward Everett ed., 1903).
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Goodyear, Circuit Justice Grier and District Judge Dickerson found
Webster’s argument compelling because they and other jurists agreed
with the Lockean principle that the patent laws secure an inventor’s
114
right to “enjoy the fruits of his invention.” Beyond employing these
positive aspects of the normative rhetoric of Lockean property theory,
nineteenth-century courts also identified patent infringers as “pirates”
who stole from inventors the valuable fruits of their labors—their
115
profits.
C. Value and Property: Antecedents and Consequents
All of this suggests that Felix Cohen and the legal realists were justified in thinking that they had to take down Lockean property theory
in order to claim that their new nominalist-positivist conception of
property won by default. James Kent, Daniel Webster, and nineteenth-century courts all employed Lockean property theory to justify
protecting intellectual property on the grounds that the law should
secure preexisting valuable fruits of inventive labors. Cohen’s claim
that Lockean property theory is “viciously circular,” although illustrated with early-twentieth-century case law, applies with equal force to
the nineteenth-century legislatures, lawyers, and courts who readily
116
invoked Lockean property theory as well.

114

Hawes v. Gage, 11 F. Cas. 867, 867 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1871) (No. 6237); see also
Birdsall v. McDonald, 3 F. Cas. 441, 444 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1874) (No. 1434) (“Patent
laws are founded on the policy of giving to [inventors] remuneration for the fruits, enjoyed by others, of their labor and their genius.”); Middletown Tool Co. v. Judd, 17 F.
Cas. 276, 278 (C.C.D. Conn. 1867) (No. 9536) (recognizing that the patent laws secure
even “the fruit of a very small amount of inventive skill”); Clark Patent Steam & Fire
Regulator Co. v. Copeland, 5 F. Cas. 987, 988 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862) (No. 2866) (“Congress has wisely provided by law that inventors shall exclusively enjoy, for a limited season, the fruits of their inventions.”); Davoll v. Brown, 7 F. Cas. 197, 199 (C.C.D. Mass.
1845) (No. 3662) (explaining that the law “protect[s] intellectual property, the labors
of the mind, productions and interests as much a man’s own, and as much the fruit of
his honest industry, as the wheat he cultivates, or the flocks he rears”); Brooks v. Bicknell, 4 F. Cas. 247, 251 (C.C.D. Ohio 1843) (No. 1944) (stating that “a man should be
secured in the fruits of his ingenuity and labor” and that “it seems difficult to draw a
distinction between the fruits of mental and physical labor”); McKeever v. United
States, 14 Ct. Cl. 396, 420 (1878) (quoting an unnamed constitutional commentator
that the Copyright and Patent Clause in Article I, Section 8, secures to authors and inventors “a natural right to the fruits of mental labor”).
115
See Mossoff, supra note 107, at 993 n.193 (listing cases in which infringers are
identified as “pirates”).
116
See supra notes 69-77 and accompanying text (explaining Cohen’s view of
Lockean theory as circular).
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In particular, the Peabody court’s use of Lockean property theory
to justify the protection of trade secrets—property owned only by
commercial firms engaged in the manufacture and sale of products or
services in the market—seems to buttress Cohen’s critique, not undermine it. Cohen could point out that a trade secret is valuable only
because its owner may obtain an injunction from a court, which is
what makes it possible for a trade secret owner to demand money
from others for permission to use the information. Without this
threat of an injunction—a state sanction enforcing a right to exclude
others from the information—no one would feel compelled to pay for
a trade secret. The result would be that a trade secret would be no
more valuable than anything else that is denied exclusive protection
by the state, such as the generic words that courts safeguard from the
117
attempts by commercial firms to trademark.
Yet the safe harbor for generic terms in trademark law highlights
an important difference between trademarks and the information
typically secured in trade secrets or patents. In using trademark doctrine to argue that Lockean property theory is conceptually incoherent, Cohen chose his doctrinal example well, as it does seem at first
blush that it is only a court’s decision to protect a trademark as “property” that makes the trademarked term economically valuable. “Cola”
is an unfettered word that is free to be used by all; but for a single
court decision, though, it would have joined “Coke” as the valuable
118
The same can
and exclusive property of the Coca-Cola Company.
119
120
be said for “brassiere,” but not “Wonderbra.”
In 1999, a federal
court held that “hog” was a freely usable generic term, rejecting
Harley-Davidson’s attempt at claiming it as a trademark for its
121
motorcycles. But for that court decision, the economic value of the
word “hog” would have skyrocketed, as Harley-Davidson would have
enforced its right to exclude others from using the term. In denying
Harley-Davidson’s claim to trademark protection for “hog,” the court
effectively valued this word at a market price of zero.

117

2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 12:1 (4th ed. 2008) (discussing the rule that firms are prohibited from
claiming trademark protection for generic terms).
118
See Dixi-Cola Labs., Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 117 F.2d 352 (4th Cir. 1941).
119
See Charles R. De Bevoise Co. v. H. & W. Co., 60 A. 407 (N.J. Ch. 1905).
120
“Wonderbra” is a trademark owned by Canadelle Limited Partnership of
Canada, a wholly owned subsidiary of HanesBrands Inc.
121
Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806 (2d Cir. 1999).
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The court decisions concerning “cola,” “brassiere,” and “hog”
seem to exemplify Cohen’s argument against Lockean property
theory: the value in something is a consequent of a court’s decision to
protect something as property, not an antecedent. Accordingly, the
only thing a court does in a property case is decide whether to grant a
right to exclude—i.e., whether to provide a plaintiff with an injunctive
remedy. The court makes this decision on the basis of pragmatic
policy concerns about the economic and social consequences of such
a decision, not on the basis of any “transcendental” claims about
preceding labor and its valuable “fruits.” The value follows logically
from the grant of the right to exclude according to Cohen, it does not
exist before this exclusive grant.
Cohen’s trademark example thus seems plausible (more on this
122
later). The problem, however, is that his argument is not solely
about trademarks, it is a general argument about the nature of
property as such. Trademarks are Cohen’s only example for his
general theoretical argument that Lockean property theory is viciously
circular in its justification for securing property rights under the law.
In sum, Cohen views Lockean property theory as begging the question
of whether to grant a right to exclude on the basis of the value in the
presumptive property at issue. It is not value, Cohen argues, that leads
to property; it is a grant of the right to exclude that leads to value.
Trade secrets and patented inventions, however, reveal the initial
cracks in Cohen’s critique. Although there are doctrinal differences
between trade secrets and patents, this is a distinction without a
difference for purposes of the analysis here. The reason is that
inventions, regardless of how they are legally protected, would be
valuable even if there were no legal system that protected them. In
fact, the protection of inventions as property under the patent laws is
a relatively modern phenomenon. The Anglo-American patent
system’s provenance reaches back only several hundred years, to
123
Parliament’s enactment of the Statute of Monopolies in 1623.
Before that, the first institutionalized legal protection of information
is found in the exclusive privileges afforded to craft knowledge in the
124
guild system of fifteenth-century Venice. Trade secret doctrine is of

122

See infra Section II.D.
See Adam Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents: An Intellectual History,
1550–1800, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1255, 1270-76 (2001).
124
See Craig Allen Nard & Andrew P. Morriss, Constitutionalizing Patents: From
Venice to Philadelphia, 2 REV. L. & ECON. 223, 233-58 (2006).
123
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even more recent vintage: there was no American trade secret
125
doctrine until the Peabody decision in 1868.
Prior to the 1623 Statute of Monopolies, the federal statutes
enacted under the Copyright and Patent Clause in the 1787 Federal
Constitution, and the Peabody decision in 1868, there was no
standardized institutional protection of property rights in new
products or processes within the Anglo-American legal system, either
as patented inventions or as trade secrets. Yet new ideas and
technologies were extremely valuable to many people throughout
history before such express legal property protections were
established. The wheel, sailing ships, and plows, to name just a few
early inventions, were valuable contributions to the progress of
human civilization long before the legal innovations of the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries.
Modern patent theory, as informed by law and economics, understands and embraces this fact. The economic analysis of patent law
assumes as one of its basic foundational premises that an invention’s
value preexists its legal classification as property in the patent system.
Ironically, modern patent scholars do so by adopting Cohen’s functionalist account in advancing a utilitarian justification for intellectual
126
property. As such, patent scholars today are wont to point out that
the patent system incentivizes inventive activity by preventing third
parties from free-riding on an inventor’s labors in creating a new
127
technology or product. The concept of free-riding presupposes that
a value preexists this free-riding behavior; otherwise, a third party
would not be interested in free-riding. Thus, the policy problem is
relatively straightforward: inventors know that they will create a valuable invention and that people will exploit the “public good” aspect of
the idea by copying it freely. The patent system corrects this “market
failure” by securing the exclusive rights of use and disposition in an

125

See supra notes 103-104 and accompanying text. To this day, England refuses to
recognize trade secrets as property, protecting them instead under various contract
and tort doctrines. See generally ALLISON COLEMAN, THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF TRADE
SECRETS 8-9 (1992).
126
See, e.g., Dennis D. Crouch, The Patent Lottery: Exploiting Behavioral Economics for
the Common Good, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 141, 141 (2008) (“[O]ur patent system is
built primarily on assumptions about how incentives operate.”).
127
See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 18-20 (2003) (discussing how “the public-good character
of intellectual property . . . can make it difficult to prevent misappropriation and to
exclude free riders” and thus “[u]nless there is power to exclude, the incentive to
create intellectual property in the first place may be impaired”).
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128

invention.
In this way, an inventor can prevent third parties from
stealing the fruits of his inventive labors, as nineteenth-century courts
129
so eloquently and succinctly phrased this policy concern.
More important, a free rider is not necessarily motivated by commercial profit in the marketplace. Although patent infringement often entails such motivations, the problem of free-riding applies to all
intellectual property. In the copyright context, the typical problem is
not that a third party wants to sell a book written by an author, but
rather that people will want to read a book, given its value to them.
Without the copyright system, people will pursue such aesthetic, cultural, and other personal values without any qualms—copying the
book and stealing the fruits of the labors of the author. The problem,
according to modern intellectual property theory, is that an author
understands this beforehand, and thus an author will decide not to
labor in writing a book in the first place.
In this way, the concept of free-riding challenges Cohen’s argument that value is a consequent, and not an antecedent, of a decision
to secure something as property. In its typical formulation, free-riding
130
entails deriving economic value from another’s efforts, which presupposes economic value before a court’s decision in a lawsuit that officially gives “property rule” protection to one of the (future) entitlement owners. But as the copyright situation discussed above makes
clear, free-riding entails the pursuit of noneconomic values as well.
Law and economics scholars often quantify such “subjective values” as
variables in their analyses of legal doctrine, such as accounting for the
131
personal value in living in one’s family home. But these are at best
rough proxies because such values are not truly fungible. This point
has long been understood in common law property doctrine, which
consistently awards injunctions, such as specific performance in con132
veyances of real property, as a default remedy. Unsurprisingly, patents, and by implication, copyrights, have also long been deemed
uniquely valuable to their owners, and thus specific performance is

128

See Mossoff, supra note 50, at 349-60.
See supra notes 114-115 and accompanying text.
130
See Lloyd Cohen, Holdouts and Free Riders, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 351 (1991).
131
See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV.
957, 995-1002.
132
See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.4, at 768 (3d ed. 1999) (“Only for
land, which English courts regarded with particular esteem, was a general exception
made [in remedies for breach of contract], on the ground that each parcel of land was
‘unique’ so money damages were inadequate.”).
129
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also a default remedy in legal disputes concerning conveyances of
133
these intellectual property rights.
This is not a knock-down argument, however, to which Felix
Cohen would not have a response. Cohen would remind us that he
does not argue that value exists if and only if something is designated
as property. He identifies air, for example, as something that is
extremely valuable and that is not designated as “property” under the
134
In this respect, Cohen is not attacking a straw man in his
law.
critique of Lockean property theory. He distinguishes between the
concepts of property and value, recognizing that one does not
necessarily lead to the other. As Cohen rightly points out, “not only is
135
there valueless property, but there is also propertyless value.”
Yet if value is a consequence of designating something as property, then how can Cohen account for such things as valueless property? If there is a grant of a right to exclude to an entitlement owner,
then it seems that its value should always follow as a result, as the
newly designated “property owner” will extract value by requiring others to pay him for access. Not so, Cohen would respond. Although
Cohen does not explicitly discuss this issue in his work on property, it
is easy to see his answer to this question. The question confuses a
necessary condition with a sufficient condition. Cohen argues that
the creation of a right to exclude is a necessary condition for value to
exist in property, such as a trademark, but it is not sufficient. There
must also be a market for the now exclusive thing—i.e., people who
are willing to pay money to entice the property owner to relinquish his
right to exclude. If there is no market, such as in Cohen’s example of
136
personal papers, then there is no value in the objects designated as
property.
The same could be said of trademarks. A term is only valuable as
a trademark, even if its owner is granted a right to exclude, if it represents a successful product in the marketplace. “Coke” is a valuable
trademark today. “Woolworth” is not. Woolworth was once one of the
largest retailers in the United States, but the company went bankrupt
and shuttered all of its stores in 1997. Thus, the designation of some133
See, e.g., Conway v. White, 9 F.2d 863, 866 (2d Cir. 1925) (“It is of course wellsettled law that a contract to sell or transfer a patented right, like a contract to sell real
estate, may be specifically enforced. The reason is that there is no accurate measure of
damages, and a pecuniary payment is inadequate relief.”).
134
Cohen, supra note 34, at 364.
135
Id.
136
See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
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thing as property is necessary for it to be valuable, but it is not sufficient. This logical insight is captured nicely in Cohen’s pithy remark
137
that “property is not wealth.”
Given Cohen’s responses to the critique of his claim that Lockean
property theory is engaging in circular reasoning, it is evident that the
problem is not in the logical form of his argument. The issue of
whether value, B, is a consequent of property, A, in a conditional
proposition—stated in symbolic logic as A o B, A, ? B—is dependent
on the specific sense that Cohen attributes to the variable
representing “value,” B. In other words, Cohen rightly believes that
value is a consequent of a property designation because he defines
this term in a specific way that logically compels him to this
conclusion. This is the topic of the next Section.
D. Value and Wealth: Genus and Species
Felix Cohen’s succinct summary of his analysis of the relationship
between value and property—“property is not wealth”—reveals the
fundamental error in his critique of Lockean property theory. Of
course, the philosophical analysis of “value” is a complex epistemological and ethical issue that has been debated for as long as philoso138
A short section cannot do
phy has existed in western civilization.
justice to the breadth and scope of the philosophical study of this subject, but such a comprehensive account is not necessary for the purposes of this Article. It is sufficient to identify the way in which
Cohen’s critique of Lockean property theory falls short of its mark.
Accordingly, it is necessary to explain only that Cohen uses “value” in
a very narrow sense—as a synonym for wealth—and that this is not the
same sense of this term as is used in Lockean property theory. This
Section will thus explicate these different conceptions of “value,”
revealing how Cohen misused intellectual property in his critique of
Lockean property theory.
Cohen does not specifically define value, but his criticism of
Lockean property theory for failing to account for the existence of
both “valueless property” and “propertyless value” reveals his concep139
tual commitments. In this argument, he subtly shifts from using the
137

Cohen, supra note 34, at 364.
See, e.g., W.T. JONES, THE CLASSICAL MIND 153 (2d ed. 1970) (explaining that
the goal of Plato’s moral philosophy was to “show that values are objective facts about
the universe and that knowledge of them is possible”).
139
See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
138
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term “value” to his conclusion that “property is not wealth.”
In
other words, Cohen believes that “value” is synonymous with “wealth”
(i.e., economic value). This sense of “value” is implicit in his use of
trademark doctrine, as he assumes that the value in the trademark is
its economic value to its owner. In fact, the value must be economic,
because if there were no profit at stake, a commercial firm would not
expend the money—the transaction costs, in economists’ parlance—
to obtain a court order that enforces its property right in a trademark.
This observation that Cohen has a very narrow concept of value
exposes a crucial mistake in his critique of Lockean property theory.
Cohen assumes that his definition of value as “economic value” or
“wealth” is the same definition used by Locke and his fellow naturalrights philosophers, scholars, and jurists. But this is a mistaken
assumption, and it undermines his claim to have proven the inherent
illogic of Lockean property theory, at least as an alternative to
Cohen’s positivist conception of property as securing only a right to
exclude.
In their intellectual context, nineteenth-century courts and legislators were not guilty of employing viciously circular rhetoric when
they used Lockean property theory to justify legal protection of property and intellectual property. To the contrary, they were identifying
that inventions produced through human ingenuity and labor, such as
141
142
143
railroad-car airbrakes, vulcanized rubber, sewing machines, or
144
incandescent lightbulbs, were valuable to human life regardless of
whether they were mass produced and sold in a highly developed
commercial economy. They were valuable because they made both
life and happiness possible, as the production of such goods is what
145
makes it possible for humans to live and flourish.
The nineteenth-century courts and legislators learned this point
146
directly from Locke, whose “mixing labor” metaphor was an almost
140

Cohen, supra note 34, at 364.
U.S. Patent No. 360,070 (filed Nov. 19, 1886) (issued Mar. 29, 1887).
142
U.S. Patent No. 3,633 (issued June 15, 1844).
143
U.S. Patent No. 4,750 (issued Sept. 10, 1846).
144
U.S. Patent No. 223,898 (filed Nov. 4, 1878) (issued Jan. 27, 1880).
145
The following four paragraphs are based on the author’s arguments in Locke’s
Labor Lost, supra note 91, at 159-61.
146
The study of Locke and other natural law philosophers was fundamental to a
legal education in the early American Republic. See 1 DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF
LEGAL STUDY 59-63 (2d ed. 1836) (identifying texts by Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca,
Grotius, Puffendorf, Locke, and others as essential subjects of study in a legal education); Louis D. Brandeis, The Harvard Law School, 1 GREEN BAG 10, 14 (1889) (discuss141
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poetic turn of phrase referring to the normative function of production
147
within Locke’s natural law moral philosophy.
Throughout chapter
five of the Second Treatise, when Locke gives illustrative examples of
what mixing labor means in creating property, this metaphor repeatedly exemplifies productive activities. Accordingly, mixing labor
represents the acts of gathering nuts, growing vegetables and fruits,
mining ore, killing a deer, catching fish, hunting a hare, cultivating
land for farming, sewing clothes, baking bread, felling timber, and,
148
last but certainly not least, fermenting wine. “Nature and the Earth
furnished only the almost worthless Materials,” writes Locke, and it is
these that “Industry . . . made use of” in creating all manner of items
149
used by people.
It is important to recognize that, for Locke, all of these productive
activities occur in the state of nature—before the evolution of money
and the creation of a commercial economy that values such products
in terms of financial wealth. In fact, Locke uses these examples of
mixing labor in the Second Treatise to make a normative claim, not a
political or economic claim, about the moral status of such activities.
His point is that production is a moral activity, because the natural law
requires that man be “bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his Sta150
tion wilfully.” According to Locke, each individual’s basic moral obligation is self-preservation, and, once this condition is met, to preserve the rest of mankind as well. If it is a moral obligation to preserve
oneself, then it follows as a corollary that the means of this preservation is a moral virtue. For mankind, the means of survival are
produced goods, such as shelter, clothing, and food. Labor is the
means by which each individual fulfills his fundamental moral
obligation because it is labor—production—that creates the products
necessary for him to live.
ing Justice Joseph Story’s appointment as a professor at Harvard Law School in 1829 to
teach, among other subjects, a course in “The Law of Nature”), reprinted in 11 GREEN
BAG 2D 483, 489-90 (2008); James Kent, A Lecture, Introductory to a Course of Law
Lectures in Columbia College (Feb. 2, 1824), in THE LEGAL MIND IN AMERICA 92, 10001 (Perry Miller ed., 1962) (identifying “the learned Grotius,” as well as “Puffendorf,
Barbeyrac, Bynkershoeck, Burlemaqui, Wolfius, Vattel, Heineccius, Montesquieu,
Rutherforth, and Martens,” as the scholars whom law students should study in preparing for a career in the law (italics omitted)).
147
See LOCKE, supra note 21, at 288 (“Whatsoever then he removes out of the State
that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and joyned to
it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his Property.”).
148
Id. at 286-91, 294-300.
149
Id. at 298 (emphasis omitted).
150
Id. at 271.
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The conclusion that the mixing-labor metaphor is simply Locke
taking poetic license in referring to production is not based only on
an inference from the natural law framework of the Second Treatise.
Locke consistently used the term “labor” throughout his writings to
refer to productive activities. In a short essay written in 1693, aptly titled Labour, Locke uses this term to refer only to those productive activities “[b]y which all mankind might be supplied with what the real
151
Labor has a similar
necessities and conveniency of life demand.”
152
meaning in Locke’s writings on education.
It is only after one has identified the production-based meaning of
Locke’s mixing-labor metaphor within the context of his natural law
ethics that it is possible to understand why Locke argues for the labor
theory of value as an essential element of his theory of property. And
it is at this important juncture that Felix Cohen’s assumption that
value means wealth leads Cohen astray in his critique. Locke is adamant in making the case “that of the Products of the Earth useful to
153
the Life of Man 9/10 are the effects of labour,” which he demonstrates
by pointing out the almost self-evident fact that the products of one
acre of farmland, such as “Straw, Bran, Bread, [and] . . . Wheat,” are
154
The sole difworth more than that same acre of land lying fallow.
ference in value between food and fallow land “is all the Effect of La155
As Locke explains, it is “Labour then which puts the greatest
bour.”
part of Value upon Land,” and “’tis to that we owe the greatest part of all
156
its useful Products.” The labor that underlies the creation of property is the same labor that creates valuable products, because mixing
157
labor means production.

151

JOHN LOCKE, Labour (1693), reprinted in POLITICAL ESSAYS 326, 328 (Mark
Goldie ed., 1997).
152
JOHN LOCKE, Of the Conduct of the Understanding, in SOME THOUGHTS
CONCERNING EDUCATION AND OF THE CONDUCT OF THE UNDERSTANDING 163, 215
(Ruth W. Grant & Nathan Tarcov eds., 1996); see also JOHN LOCKE, Some Thoughts
Concerning Reading and Study for a Gentleman (1703), reprinted in SOME THOUGHTS
CONCERNING EDUCATION AND OF THE CONDUCT OF THE UNDERSTANDING, supra, at
348. 153 LOCKE, supra note 21, at 296.
154
Id. at 298.
155
Id.
156
Id.
157
This also suggests that labor creates the conditions by which men can rise
above subsistence-level living in the state of nature and thereby transcend the “enough
and as good” proviso on original acquisition. See, e.g., id. at 294 (“[H]e who
appropriates land to himself by his labour, does not lessen but increase the common
stock of mankind.”).
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In this context, the act of mixing labor to produce new goods,
which is necessary to satisfy the obligation of the natural law of selfpreservation, logically and temporally precedes the creation of a market economy in which people engage in commercial transactions.
Consistent with classical and early-seventeenth-century natural law
158
philosophers, Locke explicitly recognizes that mixing labor (production) occurs before commercial transactions; money is only an
agreed-upon medium of exchange representing the value in items
159
As Locke deftly observes,
previously produced by an individual.
“Gold and Silver . . . has its value only from the consent of Men,
160
whereof Labour yet makes, in great part, the measure, it is plain . . . .”
However, a person who has produced something, such as picking
acorns and cooking them, may use this item without a market transaction occurring at all. A lone individual stranded on a desert island
would engage in mixing labor to produce the wares necessary to live,
such as creating food, clothing, and shelter, in the precise manner set
forth in Lockean property theory. According to Locke, this person
has produced valuable products, which is exactly what the natural law
would command him to do. Value is defined here by reference to the
requirements of self-preservation—what is required for this person to
survive is of value to him. In this context, there is no creation of
wealth because there is no market in which this individual can trade
his goods with other people using a medium of exchange. In Lockean
property theory, the market is a consequent of production—not an
antecedent.
In critiquing Locke’s genetic argument for the descriptive and
normative foundations of property—the act of production rooted in a
basic moral duty to preserve oneself—Felix Cohen presupposes the
existence of a complex industrial economy and an advanced legal system. He thus ends up using the same linguistic terms as does Locke,
especially “value,” but he defines these terms differently from Locke
158

See 1 HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE PRAEDAE COMMETARIUS [COMMENTARY ON THE
LAW OF PRIZE AND BOOTY] 227-28 (Gwladys L. Williams & Walter H. Zeydel trans., Oxford University Press 1950) (1604) (agreeing with Horace, Cicero, and Seneca that in
the early stages of the state of nature “there were no commercial transactions”); see also
id. at 230 (“At a subsequent stage in the evolution of property, . . . commerce began to
be widely practised.”).
159
See LOCKE, supra note 21, at 300-01 (recognizing that, after producing the items
necessary to live, “thus came in the use of Money, some lasting thing that Men might keep
without spoiling, and that by mutual consent Men would take in exchange for the truly
useful”).
160
Id. at 301-02.
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and the American legal professionals who implemented Lockean
property theory in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In defining value in terms of wealth in his critique of Lockean property theory, which clearly uses a different sense of this term, Cohen’s argu161
ment falls flat.
This discussion of Lockean property theory should not be misconstrued. Locke’s concepts of labor and value are not the only ones that
may be compared to Felix Cohen’s property theory, nor is Locke’s
theory necessarily the best. Locke’s property theory, though, is especially useful for two reasons, the first historical and the second conceptual. First, within the early years of the American Republic,
Locke’s property theory was the best known property theory and the
162
American lawmost influential in shaping American property law.
yers and judges in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were well
acquainted with Lockean property theory, or at least they were well acquainted with the secondary sources that reflected its influences, such
163
as William Blackstone’s Commentaries or Cato’s Letters. Accordingly, it is
important to understand Lockean property theory in order to grasp the
161

This is a rhetorical move that has a long pedigree in intellectual debate. In
fact, Locke has no grounds to complain, because he uses this technique in the First
Treatise against his own seventeenth-century antagonist, Robert Filmer, a proponent of
the political theory of the divine right of kings. See Peter Laslett, Introduction to LOCKE,
supra note 21, at 69 (“Not only did Locke refuse to meet Filmer on his own ground,
and fail to recognize the full strength, antiquity and importance of the patriarchal tradition, he persistently ignored the searching counter-criticisms which are the strength
of Filmer’s case.” (footnote omitted)).
162
See JAMES L. HUSTON, SECURING THE FRUITS OF LABOR 17 (1998) (“[T]he
American Revolution was virtually built on the labor theory of property/value.”); Underkuffler, supra note 98, at 133-42 (discussing the substantial influence of Locke’s
conception of property on early American property jurisprudence).
163
See DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, Preface to the Beacon Press Edition of THE MYSTERIOUS
SCIENCE OF THE LAW (Beacon Press 1958) (1941) (“In the history of American institutions, no other book—except the Bible—has played so great a role as Blackstone’s
Commentaries on the Laws of England.”); CLINTON ROSSITER, SEEDTIME OF THE REPUBLIC
141 (1953) (“No one can spend any time in the newspapers, library inventories, and
pamphlets of colonial America without realizing that Cato’s Letters rather than Locke’s
Civil Government was the most popular, quotable, esteemed source of political ideas in
the colonial period.”). The influence of Locke on Cato’s Letters is undeniable. See
1 JOHN TRENCHARD & THOMAS GORDON, CATO’S LETTERS 427 (Ronald Hamowy ed.,
1995) (Letter No. 62, Jan. 20, 1721) (“By liberty, I understand the power which every
man has over his own actions, and his right to enjoy the fruit of his labour, art, and industry . . . . And thus . . . every man is sole lord and arbiter of his own private actions
and property.”). The same is true of Blackstone. See generally 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *1-115 (citing Grotius, Pufendorf, and Locke repeatedly in discussing
how natural rights, including property, arise in the state of nature and how society is
formed to secure these rights).
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intellectual context in which the Peabody Court, Daniel Webster, and
other nineteenth-century legal professionals repeatedly claimed that
164
the law should secure to inventors the “fruits of their labors.”
Second, Lockean property theory, because it is so well known,
serves ideally to explain the important conceptual distinction between
value and wealth that is elided by Cohen. Economic value is only one
species of value; it is the value of an item or service as quantified in a
market according to an agreed-upon medium of exchange. This is
not the only type of value. In terms of Locke’s moral philosophy, at
least in the basic framework that he sets forth in the Second Treatise,
Locke defines value as something that serves the requirements of human life as required by the natural law. One can easily find other
senses of value, such as in the recent work of Judge Richard Posner.
Judge Posner originally agreed with Cohen that value meant wealth, as
Posner once famously argued that wealth maximization was the only
165
By the 1990s, howappropriate normative metric in legal analysis.
ever, Judge Posner abandoned this claim, developing a more general
166
pragmatic theory of law that recognizes that there are values in po167
litical and legal institutions beyond simply counting dollars.
There
are even more general definitions of value, such as Ayn Rand’s definition of this concept in her metaethics as “that which one acts to gain
168
As philosopher Tara Smith has explained, Rand
and/or keep.”
concludes that it is when one chooses to obtain and keep values in ac169
Morecord with human nature that values become moral values.
over, similar to Locke’s explanation of the evolution of money, Rand

164

See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
See generally Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J.
LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979).
166
See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 11 (1995) (defining his
pragmatic theory of law as “practical, instrumental, forward-looking, activist, empirical,
skeptical, antidogmatic, [and] experimental”).
167
See Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 14-15
(1996) (discussing myriad normative questions raised by a life sentence of a sixteenyear-old for the sale of a single marijuana cigarette); see also Martha Minow, Religion
and the Burden of Proof: Posner’s Economics and Pragmatism in Metzl v. Leininger, 120
HARV. L. REV. 1175, 1176-79 (2007) (describing the “overlap” in the domains of pragmatism and economics, and how the latter now serves the former in Posner’s mature
theory of adjudication).
168
AYN RAND, The Objectivist Ethics, in THE VIRTUE OF SELFISHNESS 13, 15 (1964).
169
See TARA SMITH, VIABLE VALUES ch. 4 (2000).
165
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predicates economic value on the existence of previously produced
170
valuable goods.
Simply put, the normative concept of “value” is broader than the
economic concept of value (wealth). In critiquing Lockean property
theory as “viciously circular,” Cohen is conflating this distinction between a genus and one of its species; in this case, it is the distinction
between value and specific types of value, such as moral value, personal value, aesthetic value, economic value, or others. Cohen would
have us count dollars as the only conceivable measure of value in
property theory. This is exactly what Cohen means when he says that
the value in a trademark necessarily follows from a court’s decision to
enforce the trademark as a property right by granting to its designated
171
As a result,
owner the right to exclude others—an injunction.
Cohen hastily dismisses Lockean property theory on the grounds that
172
“property is not wealth,” because it is only possible for wealth to be
generated after a state’s creation of a property right in a citizen.
In holding Lockean property theory accountable to this materialistic conception of value as wealth, Cohen ironically commits the same
metaphysical mistake of which he accuses earlier theories of property.
173
In short, Cohen assumes the “thingification” of value.
In Cohen’s
sense, values are only discernable things—dollars. Thus, there is “valueless property,” such as personal papers, because no one is willing to
pay for them, just as there is “propertyless value,” such as air, because
people are willing to pay for clean air (through taxes or other legal or
market mechanisms). It is surprising that Cohen assumes the “thingification” of value in a scathing critique of Lockean property theory for
its alleged “thingification” of property.
This does not mean that Cohen is incorrect that there is value,
even economic value, arising from the state’s official legal classification of something as “property.” As a result of this formal legal declaration, a property owner will receive the protection of a state’s legal
institutions, such as police and the courts. This leads to the benefits
of a legal system that clearly defines property rights and respects the
rule of law in enforcing these rights: certainty and determinacy. This
170

See Ayn Rand, What is Capitalism?, in CAPITALISM: THE UNKNOWN IDEAL 11, 26
(1967) (“The economic value of a man’s work is determined, on a free market, by a
single principle: by the voluntary consent of those who are willing to trade him their
work or products in return.”).
171
See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
172
See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
173
See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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breeds predictability, and predictability breeds stability, and stability
in legal entitlements fosters well-functioning markets, which produce
more wealth, which leads to the evolution of more diffuse types of
property, such as industrial plants, airplanes, trade secrets, and patented biotech inventions. In fact, Locke agrees with Cohen on this
point, as the lack of certainty in the state of nature concerning the security of one’s life and possessions is one of the precipitating factors
for people to quit their “Executive Power” and to create a civil society
174
and government. Even more important for Locke, the protection of
property rights in civil society makes a market system of exchange pos175
sible.
On this issue—the economic benefits directly flowing from
the express classification of something as “property” within a formal
legal system—Cohen and Locke are on common ground.
Cohen’s mistake, though, in conflating wealth with value leads
him ultimately to conflate the effective certainty in property rights
achieved through their legal protection with the existence of property
rights as such. Yet property exists in many different contexts in which
such complete legal and economic certainty does not, and may never,
exist. A commodities market is probably the most sophisticated example in which uncertainty in the future existence of property is
priced through a market mechanism. This is admittedly not a compelling counterexample, because a modern commodities market exists within a background framework of property and contract law. But
there are also numerous examples of property existing outside of any
formal legal system, such as the famous lobster gangs of Maine, which
developed their own property system given the government’s refusal
176
There are also the
to apply legal property concepts to the ocean.
equally famous Shasta County cattle ranchers in Northern California,
who chose to “opt out” of the formal legal system by creating their
177
Lastly,
own property norms among members of their community.
there are the numerous black markets that have existed throughout
human history in which exchanges of products have occurred in the
absence of any formal legal right to exclude and, in the case of the

174

LOCKE, supra note 21, at 325 (emphasis omitted).
See id. at 301 (observing that the creation of large cattle ranches in America
would not occur “where [one] had no hopes of Commerce with other Parts of the
World, to draw Money to him by the Sale of the Product”).
176
See generally JAMES M. ACHESON, THE LOBSTER GANGS OF MAINE (1988).
177
See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES (1991).
175
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former communist states in Eastern Europe, where there were express
legal pronouncements to the contrary.
In all of these circumstances, individuals are creating, transferring, and using valuable products or services. The value in these
products or services exists without any official grant of a right to exclude, and sometimes in the face of contrary legal pronouncements,
such as in the communist-era black markets. If one is uncomfortable
with the metaethical analysis of Locke or other philosophers, then the
objective existence of products or services that are produced by people, either for personal consumption or for trade in non–legally sanctioned exchanges, is empirical evidence that value is not synonymous
with wealth. It further confirms the closely related error in confusing
the effective certainty provided by an official legal enforcement of a
property right, which then generates further wealth-maximizing uses
of this property, with the existence of the value itself.
In sum, Cohen misused intellectual property in critiquing
Lockean property theory. Although not attacking a straw man per se,
Cohen’s influential scholarship did not address the actual property
theory developed by Locke and his fellow natural rights philosophers.
Cohen used patents and copyrights to ground his conceptual claim
that all property rights are defined by a right to exclude granted by
the state, and he further used trademarks to paint a picture of
178
In both instances,
Lockean property theory as “viciously circular.”
there was a surprising dearth of actual substantive argument for his
conceptual and jurisprudential claims. Notably, Locke and his heirs
in American property and intellectual property law did not share with
Cohen this narrow definition of value as wealth. In advancing his “re179
alistic definition of private property,” Cohen fired a tremendous
broadside at Lockean property theory, and missed.
It would be an error, though, to repeat the legal realists’ assumption that a theoretical position wins by default on the grounds that an
alternative theory has been shown to be inadequate or incoherent.
The preceding philosophical analysis does not establish the soundness
of Lockean property theory as it applies to real property or intellectual property, but rather it identifies only how Felix Cohen’s critique
failed to hit its mark. There may be a valid justification for the nominalist-positivist conception of property that lies outside the work of
Cohen and the legal realists, but that is beyond the scope of our pre178
179

See supra notes 69-76 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
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sent inquiry. The point here is simply that the legal realists did not
succeed in proving that Lockean property theory was inadequate or
incoherent. This intellectual history serves as an important cautionary
tale for modern intellectual property scholars seeking to build upon
the work of the Progressives and legal realists within the twenty-firstcentury administrative state.
III. PROGRESSIVISM, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY,
AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
Lawyers engaged in twenty-first-century legal battles over the doctrinal requirements of patent protection or the institutional status of
the PTO within the administrative state may find such philosophical
disputation to be excessively airy and indeterminate. This may be
true, but, as shown above, some of these modern legal disputes, as well
as the utilitarian and functionalist policies brought to bear in these legal contests, were born of these same philosophical arguments.
Within modern intellectual property scholarship, court briefs, and legislative committee reports, one can hear the echoes of the legal realists’ call for a purely functionalist account of legal entitlements serving
regulatory goals.
Lawyers and legal scholars seem unable to hear these theoretical
resonances today. Perhaps this is due to the fact that the Progressives
and legal realists succeeded in their political and legal efforts, and we
now live and work within an administrative state that regulates both
tangible and intangible property rights. Thus, almost a century after
the Progressive Era, legal professionals simply accept the administrative state and its corresponding political and legal artifacts as basic
180
This may
and undeniable facts of modern American political life.
explain why modern property scholars have never reviewed or analyzed the exact premises and reasoning used by the legal realists to effect their revolution in property theory. Even in my own past scholarship, it has seemed sufficient merely to note the shift in political and
legal theory in the Progressive Era and then move on to other theo181
retical or doctrinal concerns.

180

But see Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 1231, 1231 (1994) (“The post–New Deal administrative state is unconstitutional,
and its validation by the legal system amounts to nothing less than a bloodless constitutional revolution.” (footnote omitted)).
181
See, e.g., Mossoff, supra note 108, at 711-24.
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Yet the use and abuse of intellectual property by the legal realists
at the birth of the administrative state should not be studied by only
legal historians or philosophers. There are at least two reasons why
this topic should be of interest to lawyers and legal scholars today.
First, scholars working to integrate the patent system within the legal
and institutional framework of the administrative state are not writing
on a blank slate. To the extent that Arti Rai argues that the PTO
should be treated more on par with other administrative agencies creat182
ing and enforcing federal regulations, or that Shubha Ghosh believes
that patent law writ large is simply a species of federal regulatory pol183
icy, the legal realists foreshadowed their scholarship in many respects.
In fact, Felix Cohen did not simply critique Lockean property
theory as illogical and conceptually incoherent. Ultimately, Cohen
argued that a court decision invoking Lockean property theory “is
simply economic prejudice masquerading in the cloak of legal
184
logic.” This followed from Cohen’s belief that, in granting a right to
exclude to the creator of a trademark, courts are creating wealth by
granting coercive power to one citizen (the trademark owner) to exclude his fellow citizens from something in society (via a court injunction). After a court decision upholding a trademark as property, if
the trademark owner’s fellow citizens wish to use the mark, then they
can do so only with the owner’s permission, which is now backed by
185
the coercive power of the state. This permission is usually forthcoming—at a price.
In enforcing trademarks as property rights, Cohen concluded that
courts are using Lockean property theory and its “viciously circular”
premise about preexisting value to mask that their decisions “create

182

See Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent
System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1075 (2003) (“A policy of deference to PTO
fact finding in the context of patent denials may also discipline any institutional tendency that the Federal Circuit has towards pro-patent bias.”). To be fair, Professor Rai
highlights some policy concerns with treating the PTO exactly on par with other administrative agencies, see id. at 1132-33, but her criticisms here are entirely contingent
insofar as they are based on the PTO’s current institutional structure. Thus, for instance, her concern that the PTO has not hired any economists to assist it with costbenefit analysis of its rule changes, see id. at 1133, can be addressed with appropriate
legislation from Congress.
183
See Ghosh, supra note 3, at 1388 (“Just as securities regulation is designed to
promote investment in securities markets, so too should regulatory patent law . . . be
designed to promote trust in the process of innovation in new technologies.”).
184
Cohen, supra note 55, at 817.
185
See generally Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive
State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470 (1923).
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and distribute a new source of economic wealth or power.”
The
trademark owner’s coercive power to exclude others did not preexist a
court’s determining that the trademark is “property” and then ordering an injunction. If a court then justifies the economic value resulting from this right to exclude—the wealth and power now wielded by
the trademark owner—as a reason for defining the entitlement as
property in the first place, the reasoning is truly circular. Identifying
this descriptive fact was only part of their project, as the legal realists
also identified the normative function of this circularity: it rationalized creating sovereign power in corporations and other commercial
interests, who then profit by the permission they charge to laborers
187
and consumers for relinquishing their right to exclude.
Although Felix Cohen and his fellow legal realists were primarily
concerned with the social and economic impact of the new capital
and labor markets arising from the Industrial Revolution, their policy
arguments foretold the twenty-first-century battle over intellectual
property. One merely needs to replace the Progressives’ and legal realists’ policy concerns about “wealth” and “economic prejudice” with
modern intellectual property scholars’ policy concerns about “innovation” and “culture,” and one finds striking parallels in the respective
policy arguments. For instance, when Professor Rai criticizes the Federal Circuit’s formalist jurisprudence, arguing that “the Federal Circuit’s decisionmaking reflects not so much simple formalism as a pol188
icy of high patent protection masquerading as formalism,” one
hears the clear echoes of Cohen’s criticism of traditional trademark
doctrine as “simpl[e] economic prejudice masquerading in the cloak
189
of legal logic.”
Furthermore, some of the political or institutional goals of the
early-twentieth-century legal realists and early-twenty-first-century in-

186

Cohen, supra note 55, at 816.
See Cohen, supra note 43, at 12 (“The character of property as sovereign power
compelling service and obedience may be obscured for us in a commercial economy
by the fiction of the so-called labor contract as a free bargain and by the frequency
with which service is rendered indirectly through a money payment.”); Hamilton, supra
note 53, at 877 (“The coming of industrialism left its impact upon the words of Locke.
It separated the laborer from the instruments of production, articulated establishments into an industrial system, and enabled a capitalistic ownership to come into the
repute of a personalized property. . . . [T]he property of the Reports is not a proprietary thing; it is rather a shibboleth in whose name the domain of business enterprise
has enjoyed a limited immunity from the supervision of the state.”).
188
Rai, supra note 182, at 1110.
189
Cohen, supra note 55, at 817.
187
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tellectual property scholars parallel each other in striking ways. The
arguments of Felix Cohen and other legal realists concerning the
definition and jurisprudential foundation of property were offered in
service of the Progressives in crafting the modern administrative state.
As then-former President Theodore Roosevelt famously proclaimed in
his 1910 speech, The New Nationalism, “every man holds his property
subject to the general right of the community to regulate its use to
whatever degree the public welfare may require it,” which included,
among other things, “the right to regulate the terms and conditions of
labor, which is the chief element of wealth, directly in the interest of
190
the common good.” In 1910, such a proclamation was anything but
191
settled political or legal doctrine, contrary to Roosevelt’s assertion
that “[t]he right to regulate the use of wealth in the public interest is
192
universally admitted.” Thus, Roosevelt concluded his speech with a
rousing call for action: “The prime problem of our nation is to get
the right type of good citizenship, and, to get it, we must have pro193
gress, and our public men must be genuinely progressive.” The subsequent theoretical work in both property and constitutional law provided the justification for implementing such “genuinely progressive”
measures.
Many scholars and historians of the administrative state focus on
194
the big constitutional law issues, such as the nondelegation doctrine,

190

Theodore Roosevelt, The New Nationalism, Speech Delivered in Osawatomie,
Kansas (Aug. 31, 1910), in THEODORE ROOSEVELT, AN AMERICAN MIND 139, 146
(Mario R. DiNunzio ed., 1994).
191
See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating labor regulation
in the baking industry).
192
Roosevelt, supra note 190, at 146.
193
Id. at 149; see also Cohen, supra note 43, at 30 (asserting that “we need a certain
liberal insight into the more intangible desires of the human heart” in order to “promote a better communal life”).
194
Compare Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 332
(2002) (“Sophisticated academics can decry the naivety of a bench, bar, and public
that stubbornly cling to a model that legal events have long since left behind, but to
abandon openly the nondelegation doctrine is to abandon openly a substantial portion
of the foundation of American representative government.”), with Cass R. Sunstein,
Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 494 (1987) (“A general revival of the nondelegation doctrine would also be a mistake in light of a range of considerations: good reasons support the delegation of discretion, standards can be extrapolated from seemingly vague statutes, judicial administration of a nondelegation
principle would be both difficult and intrusive, and surrogate safeguards are available.”
(footnotes omitted)).
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and it often seems that property law issues receive short shrift. But
the property issues have been just as important. When municipalities
began to introduce zoning regulations in the 1920s, for instance, they
sometimes met resistance from landowners and other interest groups.
This occurred in New Haven, Connecticut, and, as one historical study
reports,
over time, local advocates of urban planning, armed with theories of the
“City Beautiful” movement, . . . came to dominate the discussion of land
use controls, and the actual conditions of the city became increasingly
irrelevant. Outside consultants educated residents on the theoretical superiority of zoned to unzoned land use, and in 1924 the mayor chided his
fellow citizens for failing to adopt the progressive policies already enacted
by more enlightened neighbors.196

As a result, the study notes that “[i]n 1926, despite the presence of
sophisticated patterns of coordinated land use, New Haven passed its
197
The theoretical arguments helped democfirst zoning ordinance.”
ratically accountable political elites make the case for adopting a regulatory regime for controlling the use and disposition of land. Within a
few decades of President Roosevelt’s call for more “genuinely progressive” policies, the basic structure of the modern administrative state
had been erected, with the help of legal scholars and lawyers doing
work in both constitutional and property law.
Similarly, in response to the vast technological and legal changes
that have wrought hard-fought policy debates in recent years in copyright and patent law, some intellectual property scholars have sought
to reframe intellectual property entitlements into more explicit regulatory terms. Siva Vaidhyanathan has proclaimed that “[c]opyright
198
should be about policy, not property,” and Tom Bell has explicitly
195

In modern scholarship, one oft-cited text discussing the intersection of property and constitutional law is Bruce Ackerman’s Private Property and the Constitution, supra note 25, but its omnipresence in law journal footnotes is a testament to its status as
one of the few monographs on this topic. Since its publication, a few more scholars
have addressed the topic and have engaged Professor Ackerman. See generally JAMES W.
ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF
PROPERTY RIGHTS (3d ed. 2008); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SUPREME NEGLECT: HOW TO
REVIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION FOR PRIVATE PROPERTY (2008); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985).
196
Andrew J. Cappel, Note, A Walk Along Willow: Patterns of Land Use Coordination
in Pre-Zoning New Haven (1870–1926), 101 YALE L.J. 617, 635 (1991) (emphases added)
(footnotes omitted).
197
Id. at 634.
198
SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HOW IT THREATENS CREATIVITY 15 (2001). He has argued else-
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199

characterized copyright as welfare for authors.
The institutional
implications of such theoretical moves are fairly straightforward, as
best exemplified in Pamela Samuelson’s call for a “New Deal” in copy200
right. Mark Lemley has also argued that “treating intellectual property as a form of government subsidy is more likely to get people to
201
understand the tradeoffs involved than treating it as real property.”
In converting such ideas into practical, real-world terms, Stuart Benjamin and Arti Rai have recently proposed that the federal government institute a “centralized innovation regulator” whose authority
would extend over all federal intellectual property doctrines and re202
lated legal fields affecting innovation, such as environmental policy.
Further illustrating the institutional implications of their theoretical
work, Professors Lemley, Rai, and other scholars joined as amici in
support of the PTO’s successful claim to Chevron deference in Tafas v.
203
Doll.
Given these striking parallels in both policy arguments and institutional goals, it may be fair to identify these intellectual property scholars as twenty-first-century Progressives, replicating in our new hightech world the arguments of the early-twentieth-century legal realists
who promoted the Progressive political agenda. This is not a criticism. Whether Progressivism and legal realism are normatively appealing is a subject well beyond the scope of this Article. The point
here is solely a descriptive identification: there is a deep intellectual
history to the modern scholars proposing that intellectual property
doctrines be reframed—theoretically, institutionally, and doctrinally—
into a regulatory policy framework. It is only possible to identify this in-

where that “[c]opyright is not about ‘property’ as commonly understood. It is a specific state-granted monopoly issued for particular policy reasons.” Siva Vaidhyanathan,
Copyright as Cudgel, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 2, 2002, at B7, B9, available at
http://chronicle.com/free/v48/i47/47b00701.htm.
199
See Tom W. Bell, Authors’ Welfare: Copyright as a Statutory Mechanism for Redistributing Rights, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 229 (2003).
200
See Pamela Samuelson, Toward a “New Deal” for Copyright in the Information Age,
100 MICH. L. REV. 1488 (2002) (book review).
201
Mark Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031,
1032 (2005).
202
See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy: A Structural
Perspective, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 105-07), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1259850.
203
See Brief for Intellectual Property, Administrative Law, and Public Health Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendants at 2-4, Tafas v. Dudas, 541 F. Supp. 2d
805 (E.D. Va. 2008) (No. 07-0846), rev’d sub nom. Tafas v. Doll, No. 08-1352, 2009 WL
723353 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 20, 2009).
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tellectual history, though, if one recognizes the central role of intellectual property in the legal realists’ theoretical work on property in land.
This identification also highlights some concerns in legal-realist
property theory underlying the administrative state, which leads to the
second reason that this intellectual history is important and relevant
to today’s legal disputes. Felix Cohen’s failure to respond directly to
Lockean property theory on its own terms left a substantial gap in the
theoretical support of the administrative state. His critique of
Lockean property theory constituted the substance of Cohen’s justification for his positivist claim that property is a right to exclude
204
Of course, this does not mean that Lockean
granted by the state.
property theory wins by default, which would simply repeat the mistaken premise in the work of Cohen and the other legal realists.
Moreover, it is tantamount to tilting at windmills to suggest that this is
a sufficient reason by itself to question the continued existence of the
administrative state. These are certainly not the lessons offered here.
This exposé of the failure of legal-realist property scholarship in
service of the administrative state simply portends some cautionary
tales for modern scholars advancing similar regulatory theories or institutional models of intellectual property. As a preliminary matter,
intellectual property scholars should be careful not to assume uncritically that the theoretical foundations of the administrative state are
solid enough to serve as an Archimedean point from which they may
shift intellectual property doctrines toward a regulatory entitlement
model. To do so would risk bootstrapping policy arguments from mistaken conventional wisdom about the success of legal-realist property
scholarship.
More important, intellectual property scholars should be careful
in using this conventional wisdom, because its mistaken provenance
has spawned surprisingly procrustean characterizations of Lockean
property theory within modern academic scholarship. This has occurred in modern philosophical treatments of Lockean property theory, such as in Robert Nozick’s and Jeremy Waldron’s misplaced lin205
It has also
guistic critique of Locke’s mixing-labor metaphor.
seeped into property scholarship, which often repeats the post–legal
realist conventional wisdom that Lockean property theory was phi-
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See supra Section II.B.
See Mossoff, supra note 91, at 156-63 (discussing Waldron’s and Nozick’s misunderstanding of Locke’s property theory).
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206

losophically formalistic and legally indeterminate.
Lastly, it has influenced some modern intellectual property scholarship, which has
advanced the surprising claim that intellectual property rights are, at
best, statutory exemptions from Lockean property theory, or, at worst,
207
incompatible with it. The echoes of legal-realist property theory are
heard not just in the substantive content of modern policy arguments,
but also in the very ways in which modern scholars structure their arguments and frame their descriptive and conceptual priors.
As discussed in Part II, it was neither an accident nor simply a matter of rhetoric in the service of rent-seeking interest groups that nineteenth-century courts and legislatures found Lockean property theory
to be an appropriate theoretical framework to explain and justify intellectual property rights. But to recognize why this was the case and
208
how this “conversion” from theory to practice occurred, one has to do
so from within their intellectual context. All too often, our modern
utilitarian-positivist context precludes us from grasping the basic normative and legal concepts that nineteenth-century legal scholars and
209
jurists took for granted, given their shared natural rights premises.
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See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, Commentary, The Ambiguous Work of “Natural
Property Rights,” 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 477, 478-81 (2007) (restating the postrealist critique of natural property rights theory as “indeterminate” and “ambiguous”); Abraham
Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Reconfiguring Property in Three Dimensions, 75 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1015, 1023 (2008) (asserting that in legal doctrine, “the surface attractiveness of
the Blackstonian ideal breaks down” as the conception of property, because “providing
a single owner with absolute dominion over a thing often proves unreachable, leaving
owners and the policymakers the challenge of maximizing property value”); Amnon
Lehavi, Mixing Property, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 137, 211 (2008) (“As Carol Rose has
demonstrated, even William Blackstone’s famous depiction of private property as endowing absolute rights was more wishful thinking than a depiction of the doctrinal reality of his time—an anxiety-relieving rhetoric of clarity uttered against a complex
background of overlapping interests and mixed societal values.”).
207
See Liam Séamus O’Melinn, Software and Shovels: How the Intellectual Property
Revolution is Undermining Traditional Concepts of Property, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 143, 148
(2007) (claiming that “Locke’s theory does not accord with either copyright or patent
law”); cf. Tom W. Bell, Indelicate Imbalancing in Copyright and Patent Law, in COPY
FIGHTS: THE FUTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 1, 4
(Adam Thierer & Clyde Wayne Crews Jr. eds., 2002) (“More pointedly, copyright and
patent protection contradicts Locke’s justification of property.”).
208
See Hamilton, supra note 53, at 875 (foreshadowing modern criticism of
Lockean property theory for being indeterminate given that “[t]he conversion of the
prophetic narrative of a neocanonist into a chronicle of the emergence of a legal institution is no automatic task”).
209
See, e.g., Mossoff, supra note 107, at 967-76 (identifying modern scholars’ misunderstanding of the natural rights term of art “privilege” as it was used in antiquarian
legal texts).
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This problem is even more pressing because it goes beyond understanding basic concepts in historical texts that are situated within a
bygone intellectual context, such as “labor” or “value.” Scholars have
even mischaracterized John Locke’s property theory when it is directly
accessible to modern readers. Contrary to claims by modern scholars
210
that Locke did not endorse intellectual property, Locke explicitly
recognized that his property theory justified intellectual property.
Toward the end of chapter five of the Second Treatise, Locke identifies
“Inventions and Arts” as labors that “had improved the conveniences
of Life” and that exemplified his insight that “Man (by being the Master of himself, and Proprietor of his own Person, and the Actions of La211
bour of it) had still in himself the great Foundation of Property.” Moreover, Locke explicitly endorsed copyright as the “property” of
212
authors, and he even proposed an amendment to the Bill for Regulating Printing, proposed in Parliament in 1695, in order “[t]o secure the
213
author’s property in his copy, or his to whom he has transferred it.”
Such words make clear the direct lineage between Lockean property theory and nineteenth-century American jurisprudence justifying
patents, copyrights, and other forms of intellectual property as the
214
This intellectual history can no
rightful property of their creators.
longer be dismissed as having been effectively repudiated by the legal
realists. This is particularly pressing when intellectual property scholars presume this conventional wisdom in advancing the new twentyfirst-century functionalist account of legal entitlements—intellectual
property rights as regulatory entitlements.
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See, e.g., RONAN DEAZLEY, RETHINKING COPYRIGHT 144 n.32 (2006) (“Locke
himself did not consider his theory of property extended to intellectual properties
such as copyrights and patents.”); Lior Zemer, The Making of a New Copyright Lockean, 29
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 891, 894 (2006) (describing how copyright scholars “claim that
Locke does not, either in the Two Treatises or elsewhere, address the issues of the intellectual commons, intellectual property in general, or copyright in particular”).
211
LOCKE, supra note 21, at 298-99.
212
JOHN LOCKE, Liberty of the Press, reprinted in SOME THOUGHTS CONCERNING EDUCATION AND OF THE CONDUCT OF THE UNDERSTANDING, supra note 151, at 329, 337; see
also Justin Hughes, Copyright and Incomplete Historiographies: Of Piracy, Propertization, and
Thomas Jefferson, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 993, 1012 (2006) (discussing the memorandum in
which Locke makes this argument).
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LOCKE, supra note 212, at 338.
214
See supra Section II.B.
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CONCLUSION
This Article seeks to uncover the ways in which the legal realists
used intellectual property to revolutionize property theory in land
when they began assembling the theoretical arguments for the modern administrative state. This historical analysis is especially relevant
today, and not just because, as John Duffy puts it, “[t]he most interest215
ing questions are the most fundamental.” It is important given the
increased scholarly interest in the relationship between the administrative state and intellectual property, particularly patent law. The institutional and doctrinal questions raised in Tafas v. Doll and in other
216
recent court battles are proliferating, as is the scholarship analyzing
patents and other intellectual property rights within a regulatory
framework.
Yet many scholars and lawyers remain unaware of the central role
of intellectual property within the legal-realist property theory that
underlies the administrative state. Perhaps this is the case because the
legal realists succeeded in their work. The one-two punch of their
nominalist bundle metaphor and their positivist exclusion conception
of property soon became orthodoxy within property scholarship and
among political elites. This helped justify the modern administrative
state because it made property sufficiently plastic to permit the regulation of its use and disposition by myriad state and federal regulatory
agencies. By the mid–twentieth century, the administrative state was
firmly cemented into the American political system, as Americans no
longer lived with what legal realist Walton Hamilton referred to as the
“imminent hazards to life, liberty, and property” caused by “un217
planned and undirected industrialism.” It is not a coincidence that,
at the same time as the establishment of the modern administrative
state, Charles Reich could safely assert as incontrovertible truth that
“[p]roperty is not a natural right but a deliberate construction by so218
ciety.”
These two propositions—the evolution of the administrative state
and the nominalist-positivist revolution in property theory—were
deeply intertwined in the scholarship of the legal realists working in
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Duffy, supra note 1, at 1071.
See, e.g., Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(holding that patents are not constitutional private property within the ambit of the
Takings Clause because “patent rights are a creature of federal law”).
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Hamilton, supra note 53, at 880.
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the Progressive Era. At the heart of this theoretical work was intellectual property. This insight does not by itself settle any particular institutional or legal question concerning the relationship between the
administrative state and intellectual property, but that does not mean
that this intellectual history is an idle academic inquiry. The legal realists spawned a conventional wisdom concerning the inherent conceptual incoherence of Lockean property theory and the success of
the positivist exclusion conception of property. This conventional
wisdom is all too often taken for granted within modern intellectual
property scholarship, which frequently assumes incorrectly that intellectual property and Lockean property theory are, at best, strange
bedfellows, and, at worst, outright adversaries. As such, this intellectual history contains important lessons for scholars seeking to bring
the legal realists’ arguments full circle in integrating the administrative state with intellectual property doctrines.

